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OPENING THE RANGE: REFORMS TO ALLOW MARKETS FOR
VOLUNTARY CONSERVATION ON FEDERAL GRAZING LANDS
Shawn Regan,* Temple Stoellinger** & Jonathan Wood***
Abstract
For nearly a century, the federal government has authorized ranchers
to graze livestock on large areas of federal lands in the western United
States. Federal-land grazing has generated substantial conflict in recent
decades, as conservation interests and others have lobbied and litigated
against what they view as inappropriate and destructive use of federal
lands. This has produced a predictable backlash among ranching
interests, including efforts to roll back the regulations relied on by
environmental litigants and aggressive confrontations with federal
regulators. But such conflict is not inevitable. Competing demands on
these lands can be resolved through voluntary means and positive
incentives for conservation practices, as they often are on private lands.
On public lands, however, federal law erects substantial barriers to this
market approach by imposing use-it-or-lose-it rules on federal grazing
permits. In this Article, we discuss those barriers and offer statutory and
regulatory reforms that would overcome them while facilitating markets
for conservation on federal grazing lands.
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INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, ranchers have grazed livestock on vast amounts of
public rangelands in the western United States.1 In the 1870s and 1880s, cattlemen
and sheepherders began driving millions of cattle and sheep into the western Great
Plains.2 Settlers grazed livestock on large swaths of unclaimed public-domain lands
to eke out a living and to earn title to their homestead claims.3 By the early twentieth
century, this informal practice evolved into a set of customary rights to grazing on
the open rangelands of the public domain.4 These customary rights were formalized
in early U.S. Forest Service (Forest Service) regulations to manage grazing in
national forests and later through enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA) of
1934, which established a regulated system of grazing districts, allotments, and
permits to manage livestock grazing on federal rangelands that are today managed
by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).5
This basic structure remains largely in place today. Throughout much of the
West, ranchers own title to relatively small private parcels (lands that were
privatized during the homestead era) and graze livestock on larger parcels of nearby
federal lands (often more arid or alpine lands that were not settled and thus never
privatized).6 Livestock grazing now occurs on more than 200 million acres of federal
lands in the American West—an area twice the size of California—making it the
1

See generally PHILLIP O. FOSS, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF
GRAZING ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1960); see also SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K.
FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 86–89 (2d
ed. 1980); MARION CLAWSON, THE FEDERAL LANDS REVISITED 63–72 (1983).
2
Gary D. Libecap, The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier:
Lessons for Contemporary Environmental and Resource Policy, 67 J. ECON. HIST. 257, 271
(2007).
3
Id. at 271–72.
4
TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY
RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER 159–67 (2004).
5
Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315–315r).
6
Libecap, supra note 2, at 271–74.
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most prevalent use of federal land.7 Consequently, federal-land grazing is significant
to the economies and politics of many communities in the western United States.8
Federal grazing lands can also hold significant conservation value—including
for open space, recreation, water quality, and habitat for fish and wildlife—that can
be impacted by grazing.9 Thus, the federal government’s system of allocating
permits to ranchers to graze livestock on federal lands has often been the subject of
controversy and acrimony as environmental values, economic realities, and
scientific knowledge has evolved over the decades.10 Some environmental
organizations, for instance, have regularly sued to reduce or eliminate grazing on
federal lands, claiming that this grazing is inconsistent with environmental

7
See CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44932, STATISTICS ON
LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON FEDERAL LANDS: FY2002 TO FY2016, at 2 (2017),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44932/3 [https://perma.cc/5UVM-E5K5];
see also CLAWSON, supra note 1, at 63.
8
Briana Swette & Eric F. Lambin, Institutional Changes Drive Land Use Transitions
on Rangelands: The Case of Grazing on Public Lands in the American West, 66 GLOBAL
ENV’T CHANGE 102220, at 2 (2021).
9
The extent to which livestock grazing is incompatible with the natural amenity
preservation, wildlife habitat, or the provision of certain ecosystem services is a matter of
debate. See, e.g., Kris M. Havstad, Debra P.C. Peters, Rhonda Skaggs, Joel Brown, Brandon
Bestelmeyer, Ed Fredrickson, Jeffrey Herrick & Jack Wright, Ecological Services to and
from Rangelands of the United States, 64 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 261, 263–65 (2007); Jennifer
M. Schieltz & Daniel I. Rubenstein, Evidence Based Review: Positive Versus Negative
Effects of Livestock Grazing on Wildlife. What Do We Really Know?, 11 ENV’T RSCH.
LETTERS 113003, at 1 (2016) (“In general, species adapted to open habitats are often
positively affected by grazing, while species needing denser cover are negatively affected.”);
Joseph T. Smith, Jason D. Tack, Lorelle I. Berkeley, Mark Szczypinski & David E. Naugle,
Effects of Rotational Grazing Management on Nesting Greater Sage-Grouse, 82 J. WILDLIFE
MGMT. 103, 103 (2018) (“[A] variety of locally appropriate grazing strategies focused on
fundamental range health principles may provide adequate habitat quality for nesting sagegrouse.”); Adrian P. Monroe, Cameron L. Aldridge, Timothy J. Assal, Kari E. Veblen, David
A. Pyke & Michael L. Casazza, Patterns in Greater Sage-Grouse Population Dynamics
Correspond with Public Grazing Records at Broad Scales, 27 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS
1096, 1096 (2017) (finding that the effects of livestock grazing on greater sage-grouse
populations can be positive or negative, depending on the specific grazing practices used);
Seth J. Dettenmaier, Terry A. Messmer, Torre J. Hovick & David K. Dahlgren, Effects of
Livestock Grazing on Rangeland Biodiversity: A Meta-Analysis of Grouse Populations, 7
ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 7620, 7623 (2017) (finding via a meta-analysis that livestock
grazing has an overall negative effect on grouse populations).
10
ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: THE FAILURE OF
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 222 (1995) [hereinafter NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS] (“No other area of public land management has been the subject of as much
controversy as the grazing lands.”); see also SHAWN REGAN, PROP. & ENV’T RSCH. CTR.,
PERC POL’Y SERIES NO. 54, MANAGING CONFLICTS OVER WESTERN RANGELANDS (2016),
https://www.perc.org/wp-content/uploads/old/pdfs/PERC_PS54_FINAL.pdf [https://perma
.cc/9TYJ-8GT4] (describing how competing interests over federal rangeland management
can result in conflict).
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protections.11 Tensions have also risen over the management of federally protected
endangered and threatened carnivores, like wolves and grizzly bears, that may prey
on livestock on federal lands.12 Recreation on grazed federal lands can also present
challenges for ranchers, stoking conflicts over access.13 In the worst cases, conflicts
over grazing policy have boiled over into confrontations between ranchers and the
federal government, including the armed standoff at the Bundy Ranch in Nevada in
2014 and the occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon in
2016.14

11

See, e.g., Darrell Ehrlick, To Protect Grizzlies, Groups Threaten to Sue Forest
Service over Livestock Grazing Near Yellowstone, IDAHO CAP. SUN (May 12, 2022, 2:51
PM), https://idahocapitalsun.com/2022/05/12/seven-groups-threaten-to-sue-forest-serviceover-grazing-north-of-yellowstone-national-park/ [https://perma.cc/WX8A-X2NW]; see
Guy McCarthy, Court Sides with Stanislaus National Forest, Cattle Ranchers in Grazing
Lawsuit, UNION DEMOCRAT (Apr. 19, 2022), https://www.uniondemocrat.com/news/article
_2c6f5eea-c01c-11ec-928f-23ec81517a27.html [https://perma.cc/NDG9-B38J]; Lindsey
Botts, Conservation Groups Poised to Sue Feds over Riparian Habitat Loss from Cattle
Grazing, ARIZ. CENT. (Apr. 15, 2022, 4:58 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/loc
al/arizona-environment/2022/04/13/groups-may-sue-forest-service-wildlife-service-overcattle-grazing/9464703002/ [https://perma.cc/NDG9-B38J]; Mike Garrity, Groups Halt
Grazing in Elkhorn Mountains, DAILY MONTANAN (Mar. 22, 2022, 4:55 AM),
https://dailymontanan.com/2022/03/22/groups-halt-grazing-in-elkhorn-mountains/ [https://
perma.cc/N6GJ-DPMC].
12
See, e.g., Angus M. Thuermer Jr., Ranchers: Grizzly Suit Imperils Rights, Wildlife
Migrations, WYOFILE (June 2, 2020), https://wyofile.com/ranchers-grizzly-suit-imperilsrights-wildlife-migrations/ [https://perma.cc/NEB4-FLDZ]; Don Jenkins, Ranchers Shut
Out of ESA Lawsuits over Wolves, CAP. PRESS (June 22, 2021), https://www.capitalpress.
com/ag_sectors/livestock/ranchers-shut-out-of-esa-lawsuits-over-wolves/article_101a6bb2d2cf-11eb-92d3-f78f4b55fbd2.html [https://perma.cc/JR9Q-FAHL]; Julie Lorton Conley,
Maria E. Fernandez-Gimenez, George B. Ruyle & Mark Brunson, Forest Service Grazing
Permittee Perceptions of the Endangered Species Act in Southeastern Arizona, 60
RANGELAND ECOLOGY MGMT. 136, 142–44 (2007) (noting ranchers’ negative attitudes
toward threatened and endangered species on grazing allotments).
13
See Kristina M. Wolf, Roger A. Baldwin & Sheila Barry, Compatibility of Livestock
Grazing and Recreational Use on Coastal California Public Lands: Importance,
Interactions, and Management Solutions, 70 RANGELAND ECOLOGY & MGMT. 192, 192–201
(2017); see also, e.g., April Reese, The Big Buyout, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Apr. 4, 2005),
https://www.hcn.org/issues/295/15398 [https://perma.cc/V4M6-BJ44]; Carol Ryan Dumas,
Conflicts Growing Between Ranchers, Recreationists, CAP. PRESS (Nov. 18, 2021),
https://www.capitalpress.com/ag_sectors/livestock/conflicts-growing-between-ranchersrecreationists/article_f9050296-48a0-11ec-83e2-5b8ce69d38d6.html [https://perma.cc/HV
V2-Z5G8].
14
See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, A Defiant Rancher Savors the Audience that Rallied to
His Side, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/us/politics/ran
cher-proudly-breaks-the-law-becoming-a-hero-in-the-west.html [https://perma.cc/5Y2VD52F]; see also Tay Wiles, Malheur Occupation, Explained, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jan. 4,
2016), https://www.hcn.org/articles/oregon-occupation-at-wildlife-refuge [https://perma.cc/
Q3R3-TNYD].
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On private lands, similar conflicts can be—and often are—resolved through
voluntary markets, including conservation easements and contracts that compensate
landowners for adopting conservation practices.15 But federal law and regulation
prevent such voluntary and flexible solutions to conflicts on federal lands. For
instance, federal law restricts who can hold grazing permits, limits permittees’
ability to modify their grazing practices, and, most notably, prohibits permittees
from voluntarily reducing their grazing levels.16 Running afoul of these policies can
result in a permit being canceled, forage being allocated to someone else, and,
ultimately, frustration of voluntary conservation. 17
Such “use it or lose it” requirements can exacerbate conflict by giving ranchers
and conservation interests no alternative to political, legal, or administrative conflict.
The result is a status quo that pits ranchers and environmentalists against each other
in what amounts to a negative-sum fight over control of federal rangelands and landuse decisions.18
The time may be ripe to reconsider these obstacles to voluntary conservation
on federal grazing lands. Many environmental organizations have grown frustrated
with the no-win outcomes produced by litigation and political conflict over federal

15

Holly Doremus, A Policy Portfolio Approach to Biodiversity Protection on Private
Lands, 6 ENV’T SCI. & POL’Y 217, 217–21 (2003); see Dominic P. Parker, Land Trusts and
the Choice to Conserve Land with Full Ownership or Conservation Easements, 44 NAT. RES.
J. 483 (2004); see also LOWELL E. BAIER, SAVING SPECIES ON PRIVATE LANDS: UNLOCKING
INCENTIVES TO CONSERVE WILDLIFE AND THEIR HABITATS 178–207 (2020).
16
See Bryan Leonard & Shawn Regan, Legal and Institutional Barriers to Establishing
Non-Use Rights to Natural Resources, 59 NAT. RES. J. 135, 144–51 (2019) [hereinafter
Leonard & Regan, Legal and Institutional Barriers]; Bryan Leonard, Shawn Regan,
Christopher Costello, Suzi Kerr, Dominic P. Parker, Andrew J. Plantinga, James Salzman,
V. Kerry Smith & Temple Stoellinger, Allow “Nonuse Rights” to Conserve Natural
Resources, 373 SCI. 958, 959–60 (Aug. 27, 2021) [hereinafter Leonard et al., Allow “Nonuse
Rights”].
17
See Leonard & Regan, Legal and Institutional Barriers, supra note 16, at 144–59.
18
The status quo defies easy description. Grazing privileges are treated as de facto
rights by many, including generational ranch businesses that expect to continue operating
indefinitely, base property purchasers who capitalize the grazing privilege into the purchase
price, and lenders who use that capitalization when setting loan terms. See Robert H. Nelson,
How to Reform Grazing Policy: Creating Forage Rights on Federal Rangelands, 8
FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 645, 649 (1997) [hereinafter Nelson, Reform Grazing Policy].
Moreover, grazing permittees often own the water rights associated with an allotment,
without which the land cannot be effectively used or managed. However, grazing privileges
are clearly not formal property rights. While the Taylor Grazing Act charges the BLM with
“adequately safeguard[ing]” grazing privileges, it also makes explicit that these privileges
create no “right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands.” 43 U.S.C. § 315b. Citing this
language, courts have repeatedly held that a grazing permit is subject to none of the
protections ordinarily afforded to property rights. See, e.g., Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt,
529 U.S. 728, 741 (2000).
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grazing.19 Indeed, several groups have bought out grazing permits or otherwise
contracted with federal-land ranchers to improve conservation outcomes despite the
substantial risk that policy barriers could nullify these arrangements.20 Facing rising
land values and volatile commodity prices, ranchers have shown interest in
diversified income streams, including conservation-related sources.21 Further, in
2021, the Biden Administration launched an effort to conserve 30% of all U.S. lands
and water by 2030 through the America the Beautiful campaign—which emphasizes
collaborative, locally driven, and voluntary efforts—as the centerpiece of its
conservation strategy.22
This Article offers legislative and administrative reforms that would allow
voluntary conservation on federal grazing lands, thereby facilitating cooperation and
negotiation between ranchers and conservation groups rather than counterproductive
conflict. Importantly, these structural reforms would not give ranchers and
conservation groups a single tool but would open a larger toolbox to address land19

See, e.g., Shawn Regan, Why Don’t Environmentalists Just Buy the Land They Want
to Protect? Because It’s Against the Rules, REASON (Dec. 2019), https://reason.com/2019/
11/18/why-dont-environmentalists-just-buy-the-land-they-want-to-protect-because-its-agai
nst-the-rules/ [https://perma.cc/EG6C-C4XQ] (quoting one representative from the
environmental group WildEarth Guardians expressing dissatisfaction with grazing
litigation); see also Nelson, Reform Grazing Policy, supra note 18, at 650 (noting that
environmental activists seeking to reduce livestock grazing on federal lands now favor
“giving ranchers the right to sell their access to federal land forage” as opposed to “the triedand-true method of the contemporary environmental movement: by persuading the federal
government to wield a command-and-control stick to compel compliance with
environmental objectives.”).
20
Leonard & Regan, Legal and Institutional Barriers, supra note 16, at 144–59.
21
See NAT’L CATTLEMEN’S BEEF ASS’N, 2022 POLICY PRIORITIES, https://www.ncba.
org/Media/NCBAorg/Docs/22-policy-priorities.pdf [https://perma.cc/93VH-ALPZ] (last
visited Aug. 12, 2022) (identifying support for voluntary conservation programs in the Farm
Bill as policy priority); see also Elk Occupancy Agreements, PROP. & ENV’T RSCH. CTR.,
https://www.perc.org/elk-occupancy-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/DP96-VJU6] (last
visited Aug. 7, 2022) (describing a contract between conservation groups and a rancher to
protect winter elk habitat in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem); Grassbanking, UNIV. OF
WYO.: HAUB SCH. OF ENV’T & NAT. RES., http://www.uwyo.edu/haub/ruckelshausinstitute/private-lands-stewardship/conservation-toolbox/grassbanking.html [https://perma
.cc/RLD4-RCB7] (last visited Aug. 8, 2022) (describing how the Nature Conservancy’s
Matador Ranch grass bank rewards neighboring landowners who adopt conservation
practices); Jim Knight, Turn Your Ranch’s Wildlife into an Asset, MSU EXTENSION: ANIMAL
& RANGE SCIS., https://animalrangeextension.montana.edu/range/wildlife-habitat/turnranch-asset.html [https://perma.cc/R445-U6NX] (last visited Aug. 7, 2022) (describing
outfitting opportunities for ranchers).
22
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CONSERVING AND RESTORING AMERICA THE
BEAUTIFUL (2021), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/report-conserving-and-restoring
-america-the-beautiful-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2K5-356P] (“The President’s directive
recognizes the opportunities that America’s lands and waters offer and outlines a historic and
ambitious challenge to the nation. The U.S. should aim to conserve ‘at least 30 percent of
our lands and waters by 2030.’” (citation omitted)).
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use issues. With greater flexibility, parties could find the solutions that work best for
them and the particular situation. In some cases, it may make sense for a
conservation group to “buy out” a rancher looking to exit the ranching business by
acquiring a permit with the intent not to graze. In others, a contract that compensates
a rancher for modifying grazing practices or the extent of grazing to produce some
conservation benefit may be the more desirable approach. In Part I, we provide an
overview of federal grazing policy, and in Part II, we discuss the policy arguments
for a market-based solution to conservation of federal grazing lands. In Part III, we
discuss the legal and policy barriers to market-based solutions, and Part IV offers
several policy pathways to allow voluntary conservation on federal grazing lands.
I. THE FEDERAL-LAND GRAZING INSTITUTION
Livestock grazing occurs on about 220 million acres of federal land, meaning
federal rangelands far exceed the National Wilderness Preservation System (111
million acres) and the National Park System (80 million acres).23 These lands are
managed through nearly 18,000 permits administered by the BLM covering 138.7
million acres and 6,000 permits administered by the Forest Service covering more
than 93 million acres.24 Altogether, federal grazing lands make up approximately
43% of all rangelands in the United States.25
This Part describes: (A) how so much federal land became primarily used for
grazing; (B) how the basic institution for regulating grazing was established; and (C)
the variety of environmental rules that have been layered on top of that institution.
It concludes by (D) describing some of the conflicts that have arisen as
environmental values have evolved, interest in outdoor recreation has boomed, and
the economic challenges facing western ranchers have changed.

23

See VINCENT, supra note 7, at 2 (providing the acreage of grazing lands); CAROL
HARDY VINCENT, LAURA A. HANSON & LUCAS F. BERMEJO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42346,
FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 5 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov
/product/pdf/R/R42346 [https://perma.cc/4S93-TLNA] (providing the acreage of National
Park System); Wilderness, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.usda.gov/managingland/wilderness [https://perma.cc/33WT-7VJ2] (last visited Aug. 11, 2022) (providing the
acreage of National Wilderness Preservation System).
24
CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS21232, GRAZING FEES: OVERVIEW
AND
ISSUES 1–2 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21232
[https://perma.cc/YNC8-LYAQ] (“On BLM rangelands, in FY2017, there were 16,357
operators authorized to graze livestock, and they held 17,886 grazing permits and leases. . . .
On FS rangelands, in FY2017, there were 5,725 permit holders permitted (i.e., allowed) to
graze commercial livestock, with a total of 6,146 active permits.”). Grazing is also authorized
on some units of the National Wildlife Refuge System and National Park System. Id. at 1
n.1.
25
See About Rangeland Management, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/range
land-management/aboutus/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/NF68-VYPP] (last visited Aug. 7,
2022) (“The federal government manages 43 percent of the rangelands. State and local
governments manage the remainder.”).
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A. Grazing in the Wild West
After the Louisiana Purchase, U.S. land policy in the nineteenth century
encouraged western settlement and the use of the region’s natural resources to spur
economic development within the nation’s newly expanded territory. Federal
homestead acts, for example, allowed any U.S. citizen or prospective citizen to claim
160, 320, and, later, 640 acres by living on the land for five years, improving it, and
paying a nominal fee.26 While these acreages might have been sufficient to
economically farm crops in the more fertile areas, a rancher raising livestock in more
arid areas needed 2,000 to 50,000 acres of land to be able to economically graze
cattle.27 As a result, western livestock owners used the open range on the federal
public domain and forest reserve lands to expand their available grazing acreage.28
Over time, unrestricted livestock grazing on the open public domain resulted in
resource degradation, described by many as a classic example of the “tragedy of the
commons.”29 Because each grazing operator’s incentive was to graze as many
26

Valerie Weeks Scott, The Range Cattle Industry: Its Effect on Western Land Law, 28
MONT. L. REV. 155, 160 (1967) (“Under the Homestead Act he could take title in five years
to 160 free acres surrounding his ranch house. Under the Preemption Act of 1841 he could
get title to 160 more, as well as title to 160 free acres under the Timber Culture Act and 640
acres under the Desert Land Act in some states.”). The Kinkaid Act of 1904 authorized 640acre claims in western Nebraska. Kinkaid Act of 1904, Pub. L. No. 58-233, 33 Stat. 547,
repealed by FLPMA, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2743, 2786 (1976). In 1909, 320acre claims were allowed. See Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909, Pub. L. 60-245, 35 Stat.
639, repealed by FLPMA, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2743, 2786 (1976). In 1916,
the Stock Raising Homestead Act allowed 640-acre claims to grazing lands but reserved the
minerals underneath the surface in federal ownership. Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916,
Pub. L. No. 64-290, 39 Stat. 862, repealed by FLPMA, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 702, 90 Stat.
2743, 2786 (1976).
27
Scott, supra note 26, at 159.
28
Id.; see also John D. Leshy & Molly S. McUsic, Where’s the Beef? Facilitating
Voluntary Retirement of Federal Lands from Livestock Grazing, 17 N.Y.U. ENV’T. L. J. 368,
372 (2008) (“For a long time, the official U.S. policy toward livestock grazing on federal
lands was silence. . . . [T]hese lands were treated as a commons, open to all comers. And
come the livestock operators did, literally in droves, flooding the lands with millions of head
of cattle and sheep beginning in the 1880s.”).
29
The tendency for open-access resources to be overused was famously described as
“the tragedy of the commons” by Garrett Hardin in 1968, but the idea predates Hardin. See
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968); see also, e.g., H. Scott
Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL.
ECON. 124 (1954). For discussions in the context of U.S. public domain grazing, see Pub.
Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 732 (2000) (noting that “more cattle meant more
competition for ever-scarcer water and grass[,]” which “along with droughts, blizzards, and
growth in homesteading, . . . aggravated natural forage scarcity.”); see also Libecap, supra
note 2, at 274 (quoting a 1916 Department of Agricultural study, which noted that “[t]he only
protection a stockman has is to keep his range eaten to the ground and the only assurance
that he will be able to secure the forage crop any one year is to graze it off before someone
else does”).
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livestock as possible on the open and free range before someone else’s livestock
consumed the available forage, federal lands were substantially overgrazed.30
This, in turn, led to “diminished profits, and hostility among forage
competitors—to the point where violence and ‘wars’ broke out, between cattle and
sheep ranchers, between ranchers and homesteaders, and between those who fenced
and those who cut fences to protect an open range.”31 This situation led to calls for
a federal law to “regulate the land that was once free.”32 In response, Congress
passed the Unlawful Inclosures Act of 1887, which forbade anyone from fencing off
the public domain lands or otherwise unlawfully denying others access to them.33
B. The Foundation of the U.S. Grazing Institution
Congress also gradually responded to the tragedy of the commons playing out
on western rangelands.34 The first regulation of grazing on federal land occurred on
designated forest reserves after Congress in the Organic Act of 1897 gave the
executive branch authority to regulate “occupancy and use” of forest reserves.35 At
this time, grazing, not timber harvesting, was the primary commercial use of the
forests.36 In 1901, the Bureau of Forestry took initial steps to regulate grazing,
including implementing a permit system, and in 1906, the newly created Forest
Service added a fee requirement.37 In 1911, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Grimaud upheld the Forest Service’s authority to charge a fee for grazing on federal
30

See Leshy & McUsic, supra note 28, at 372 (“In most arid parts of the West, entire
ecosystems were, within a span of a few short years toward the end of the nineteenth century,
degraded and permanently transformed.”).
31
Pub. Lands Council, 529 U.S. at 732.
32
Id.
33
Pub. L. No. 48-149, 23 Stat. 321 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061–1066).
34
Pub. Lands Council, 529 U.S. at 732–33 (noting that members of Congress regularly
introduced legislation seeking to address grazing on the public domain, but political
opposition to federal regulation was strong). The Supreme Court included the following
quote from President Roosevelt who attributed the political opposition to “those who do not
make their homes on the land, but who own wandering bands of sheep that are driven hither
and thither to eat out the land and render it worthless for the real homemaker” as well as “the
men who have already obtained control of great areas of the public land . . . who object . . .
because it will break the control that these few big men now have over the lands which they
do not actually own.” Id. (quoting 41 CONG. REC. S3618 (Feb. 22, 1907)).
35
Leshy & McUsic, supra note 28, at 373 n.18 (noting that the 1897 law failed to
mention the grazing in the context of regulating occupancy and use).
36
WILLIAM D. ROWLEY, U.S. FOREST SERVICE GRAZING AND RANGELANDS: A
HISTORY 3–5 (1985).
37
Id. at 40–41, 60. The initial fee schedule called for cattle and horses to graze at 20 to
35 cents per head in the summer and 35 to 50 cents for the whole year. Id. at 60. Sheep were
charged 5 to 8 cents for the summer and goats were charged 8 to 10 cents for the summer.
Id. Because forest reserve regulation of grazing predated grazing regulation on the public
domain by over thirty years, the early forestry officials became the “pioneers of governmentrange regulation and resource use.” Id. at 21.
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lands.38 However, the vast majority of public rangelands were not forest reserves
and, thus, remained open and unrestricted for livestock grazing.39
After a period of tough times for western ranchers that included drought,
agricultural depression, conflict among grazers, and deteriorating rangeland
conditions, the situation reached a tipping point in the early 1930s.40 Congress,
spurred to action, passed the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934, which ended the tradition
of free, uncontrolled grazing and in its place enacted a system of range allocation.41
To “promote the highest use of the public lands,”42 the TGA charges the Secretary
of Interior to regulate grazing on non-Forest Service public domain lands to “stop
injury to the public grazing lands by preventing overgrazing and soil deterioration,
to provide for their orderly use, improvement, and development, to stabilize the
livestock industry dependent upon the public range, and for other purposes.”43 To
accomplish these goals, the TGA provided the Secretary of the Interior with
authority to divide the unreserved federal public domain into grazing districts
consisting of lands chiefly valuable for grazing, issue grazing permits for these
lands, charge fees, and create other necessary rules and regulations.44 Within a few
years, the Department of the Interior closed virtually the entire public domain by
withdrawing available lands into grazing districts.45
In passing the TGA, Congress reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s holding in
Buford v. Houtz that livestock grazers held only a revocable license to use the federal

38

220 U.S. 506 (1911). The Court defended the fees as necessary to prevent excessive
grazing thereby protecting the resources of the forest and to provide a slight income to the
agency to cover the expenses of the program. See ROWLEY, supra note 36, at 68.
39
Congress rejected the initial proposals to establish a leasing system for grazing on
public domain for fear it would cut off opportunities for newcomers to the West. ROWLEY,
supra note 36, at 18–19.
40
Leshy & McUsic, supra note 28, at 374.
41
Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315–315r).
42
43 U.S.C. § 315.
43
Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269, 1269 (1934).
44
43 U.S.C. §§ 315, 315a, 315b. Under the TGA, the Secretary of the Interior was given
authority to establish grazing districts over the remaining unreserved public domain land, but
not on “national forests, national parks and monuments, Indian reservations, revested Oregon
and California Railroad grant lands, or revested Coos Bay Wagon Road grant lands.” Id. §
315. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the BLM’s authority to charge a fee for grazing in
Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354 (1941). William Rowley notes that despite Forest Service’s
experience in grazing regulation it was not designated as the heir to the public domain for a
number of reasons including: “(1) the stock industry’s resentment of the service and its
policies; (2) the desire to have the new agency more under the control of stockmen; (3) the
desire of the Interior Department for greater authority; and (4) the continued lack of any
explicitly stated lawful authority for the Forest Service to administer range resources.”
ROWLEY, supra note 36, at 152.
45
ROBERT GLICKSMAN & GEORGE COGGINS, MODERN PUBLIC LAND LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 257 (4th ed. 1995).
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land.46 The TGA specifically states that grazing permits “shall not create any right,
title, interest, or estate in or to the lands.”47 Reflecting the nature of a grazing lease
as a privilege rather than a property right, the grazing regulations in effect since 1938
make the agency’s grant of grazing permits discretionary and revocable.48 The
regulations provided the Secretary with authority to cancel permits under some
circumstances,49 reclassify and withdraw land from grazing and devote it to another
more valuable or suitable use,50 or suspend grazing permits (in whole or in part) in
the event of range depletion.51
The Department of the Interior developed basic rules for the allocation of
grazing permits by 1937.52 These rules gave first preference to livestock owners who
also owned “base property” (land or water rights) sufficient to support their herds
and who had grazed on the public range during the five years prior to the TGA’s
enactment.53 The inclusion of privileges for base property owners acknowledged that
the established practice of ranchers was to keep livestock on home or base property
for part of the year and then move them to federal land at other times. The regulations
provided grazing permits for a certain number of livestock, measured in animal unit
months (AUMs),54 for up to ten years.55 AUMs were based on the concept of
carrying capacity, a measure of an allotment’s capacity to sustainably and
productively support livestock.56
46

133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890) (holding that “there is an implied license, growing out of
the custom of nearly a hundred years” that the public domain shall be “free and open to the
people who seek to use them”).
47
43 U.S.C. § 315b.
48
Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 735 (2000) (“But the conditions placed
on permits reflected the leasehold nature of grazing privileges, consistent with the fact that
Congress had made the Secretary the landlord of the public range and basically made the
grant of grazing privileges discretionary.”). The BLM’s authority to modify, suspend, or
revoke grazing permits for noncompliance with the TGA or with permit terms is an inherent
part of the power to issue such permits. Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397
(10th Cir. 1976) (establishing first instance in which a BLM decision to suspend grazing
privileges for a violation of the regulations reached a court). The BLM TGA regulations were
initially called the “Range Code,” however, that term was dropped after the enactment of
FLPMA and PRIA. See Delmer & Jo McLean v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 133 Interior Dec.
225, 241 n.8 (IBLA 1995).
49
43 C.F.R. § 4170.1-2.
50
Id. § 4110.4-2(a)(2).
51
Id. § 4110.3-2(a).
52
Pub. Lands Council, 529 U.S. at 734.
53
Id.
54
An animal unit month (AUM) refers to the amount of forage needed to sustain one
animal unit (one cow/calf pair or 5 sheep) for one month. Karla H. Jenkins, Understanding
AUMs (Animal Unit Months), UNIV. NEB. (May 2013), https://beef.unl.edu/cattleproduction
/understandinganimalunitmonths [https://perma.cc/7Q4E-SEE4].
55
43 U.S.C. § 315b.
56
Swette & Lambin, supra note 8, at 2–3 (noting that the “goal” of the carrying capacity
concept was to “maintain rangeland vegetation as close to climax species composition as
possible, which was the standard measure of range condition”).
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C. Incorporating Modern Environmental Regulation into the Institution
While ending open access and allocating rights to graze allotments to particular
ranchers addressed the tragedy of the commons, it did not fully address other
concerns about the health of rangelands and ecosystems that depend on them. Nor
did it resolve growing conflicts over how the grazing of federal lands affects other
potential public uses of those lands. Those issues led Congress to enact a series of
laws during the 1960s and 1970s.
In 1960, in reflection of the shift toward greater multiple-use of national forests
and to ensure the Forest Service discretion to permit forest uses other than the timber
and watershed protection originally prescribed in its Organic Act, Congress passed
the Multiple Use-Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA).57 The Act directed that national
forests “shall be administered” for a diversity of uses, including “outdoor recreation,
range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.”58 While promoting
multiple-use of federal land resources, the MUSYA acknowledged that “some land
will be used for less than all of the resources . . . .”59 Despite range being listed
alongside the other multiple uses, at the time of the MUSYA’s passage, the livestock
industry purportedly feared the inclusion of outdoor recreation as a threat to grazing
in national forests.60
Nine years after the passage of the MUSYA, Congress passed the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which, although not specifically enacted to
regulate federal-land grazing, has had a major impact on federal rangeland
management.61 NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact
statement, a potentially costly and time-consuming process, for every major federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.62 In an initial
attempt to comply with the new law, the BLM prepared a programmatic
environmental impact statement covering its entire grazing program, intending the
statement to serve as the foundation for all subsequent actions implementing the
program.63 The BLM’s NEPA approach, however, was rejected by environmental
groups, most notably in the case of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton. In this case, the District Court for the District of Columbia directed the
BLM to prepare individual statements for grazing for each of its more than 200
planning units.64
57

16 U.S.C. §§ 528–531.
Id. § 528.
59
Id. § 531.
60
ROWLEY, supra note 36, at 231.
61
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370.
62
Id. § 4332(2)(c). Federal agencies prepare environmental assessments (EAs) for
proposed federal actions that do not meet the EIS bar, but also have greater impacts than
actions determined to be categorically excluded. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.4.
63
See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 832–33 (D.D.C. 1974).
64
See id. at 838–39 (finding that the programmatic approach did “not provide the
detailed analysis of local geographic conditions necessary for the decision-maker to
determine what course of action is appropriate under the circumstances”).
58
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The Natural Resource Defense Council later argued that the BLM should
further refine its NEPA approach and prepare a NEPA analysis for each individual
grazing allotment within a district.65 This argument was rejected by the Federal
District Court of Nevada in 1985, which found that NEPA did not require that level
of specificity.66 Ten years later, however, an administrative law judge in the
Department of the Interior ruled that the BLM violated NEPA by failing to prepare
an environmental impact statement that analyzed the specific impacts of livestock
grazing in the Comb Wash Allotment in southeastern Utah and included site-specific
information about the allotment.67
In response to the Comb Wash ruling, Congress passed an appropriations bill
rider in 2003 that allowed grazing permits on both BLM and Forest Service lands to
be renewed pending NEPA compliance through 2008.68 In 2008, the BLM issued a
new handbook on NEPA that included a categorical exclusion from NEPA for most
decisions involving the issuance and renewal of grazing permits.69 Today, most
grazing permits are analyzed under this categorical exclusion or an environmental
assessment.70
In 1976, Congress passed two major statutes requiring comprehensive land-use
planning on federal lands. The National Forest Management Act (NFMA)71 applies
specifically to national forests while the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA)72 primarily addresses the former public domain lands managed by the
BLM. Both NFMA and FLPMA have implications for federal grazing management.
65

See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1055 (D. Nevada 1985).
See id. at 1051, 1059 (noting that a “document addressing the ecological and other
impacts for each set of permutations of stocking levels would be a completely unmanageable
undertaking”).
67
See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 140 Interior Dec. 85 (IBLA
1997); see also Joseph M. Feller, What Is Wrong with the BLM’s Management of Livestock
Grazing on the Public Lands?, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 555, 591–600 (1994) (stating that the
administrative law judge specifically found that the BLM failed to consider the impacts of
grazing on riparian areas, vegetation, and wildlife habitat).
68
Blue Ridge National Heritage Area Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-108, § 140, 117
Stat. 1274 (2003) (codified as amended as a note at 54 U.S.C.A. § 320101).
69
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT HANDBOOK H1790-1, at 150–51 (2008), https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/uploads/Media_Library
_BLM_Policy_Handbook_h1790-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8CV-NQ9J]; see also Mark
Squillace, Grazing in Wilderness Areas, 44 ENV’T L. 415, 430–31 (2014) (noting that if a
grazing allotment has not been assessed and evaluated, or if the allotment is not meeting land
health standards, then full NEPA compliance is required before permit may be issued or
renewed).
70
WYO. DEP’T OF AGRIC., A RANCHER’S GUIDE TO NEPA AND PERMIT RENEWALS:
WYOMING 3 (2016), https://rangemanagement.extension.colostate.edu/wp-content/uploads
/sites/42/2018/05/WY-2016-nepa-for-ranchers.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ5T-HJUP].
71
Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–
1687).
72
Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–
1785).
66
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NFMA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to assess forest lands and develop
a Land and Resource Management Plan (Forest Plan) for each unit of the National
Forest System based on multiple-use, sustained-yield principles.73 Forest Plans
specify which areas of the forest are open or closed to livestock grazing based on
the landscape’s suitability, which includes an analysis of environmental and
economic factors.74 The Forest Service then implements Forest Plans through sitespecific actions. NFMA and Forest Service regulations require that proposed
actions, including grazing allotment decisions, be consistent with the Forest Plans
for each unit of the National Forest System.75
FLPMA mandates that the BLM manage its lands for multiple uses and
sustained yield and that federal lands be inventoried systematically and subjected to
land-use planning processes.76 FLPMA did not repeal the TGA; instead, it “added a
new management structure” that the Secretary is required to follow when
implementing the TGA.77 However, FLPMA does provide that, as long as an
allotment remains open to grazing, the existing permittee has first priority for permit
renewal, provided the land-use plan continues to make the land available for
livestock grazing.78 FLPMA also strengthens the BLM’s discretion to decide
whether lands should be available for grazing through the land-use planning
process.79 FLPMA further specifies that when a grazing permit is canceled for public
purposes, the permittee is entitled to compensation for the adjusted value of
permanent improvements that were constructed in the federal allotment, such as
fences and water tanks, up to the value of the terminated portion of the permit.80
Two years after the passage of FLPMA, Congress passed the Public Rangelands
Improvement Act of 1978 (PRIA),81 which reaffirms the “national policy and
commitment to: . . . manage, maintain, and improve the condition of the public
rangelands so that they become as productive as feasible for all rangeland

73

See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(a), (e)(1).
See Wilderness Soc’y v. Thomas, 188 F. 3d 1130, 1134–36 (9th Cir. 1999) (outlining
historical process of determining suitability); 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.8, 219.19 (detailing
requirements to incorporate sustainability maintenance in planning decisions).
75
16 U.S.C. § 1604(i); 36 C.F.R. § 222.1(b).
76
16 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1604.
77
Lisa J. Hudson, Judicial Review of Bureau of Land Management’s Land Use Plans
Under the Federal Rangeland Statutes, 8 PUB. LAND L. REV. 185, 188 (1987).
78
43 U.S.C. § 1752(c).
79
Id. § 1752. The 1978 grazing regulations issued after the passage of FLPMA further
tied permit renewal and validity to the land use planning process, giving the Secretary the
power to cancel, suspend, or modify grazing permits due to increases or decreases in grazing
forage or acreage made available in the applicable land use plan. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.3-2(b);
id. § 4110.4-2.
80
43 U.S.C. § 1752(g). A permittee’s claim for compensation only arises if the
government cancels a grazing permit; a mere lease suspension does not require
compensation. Sacramento Grazing Ass’n Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 211, 214–15
(2005).
81
Pub. L. No 95-514, 92 Stat. 1803 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C §§ 1901–1908).
74
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values . . . .”82 PRIA also includes a Congressional finding that “vast segments of
the public rangelands” were found to be “producing less than their potential” for the
multiple uses for which they were being managed.83 To address the situation,
Congress directed $2 billion to fund range improvements and directed the BLM to
regularly assess range conditions to ensure that PRIA’s goals were met.84
Although these subsequent acts have imposed additional environmental
provisions, land-use planning requirements, and multiple-use mandates, the TGA
remains the foundation of grazing on BLM land today.85 While the TGA does not
apply to national forests, the Forest Service’s grazing program is similar to the
BLM’s and has likewise remained relatively stable for decades.86
D. Continuing Conflict over Federal Grazing
The statutes discussed above and other environmental laws did not end conflict
between ranchers, conservation interests, and regulators. Instead, new legislation
often channeled conflicts into the courtroom to determine which federal lands should
be grazed, how, and how much.87 Land-use plans and individual grazing permits are
often challenged for negatively affecting water quality, endangered species, public
recreation, and other competing values.88 Sometimes, these cases have resulted in
the closure of allotments or the imposition of additional restrictions on grazing
permittees.89 But, as John D. Leshy and Molly S. McUsic have noted, litigation has
not been successful in changing the U.S. grazing institution, in part because federal
judges have little interest in being the “rangemaster” of hundreds of millions of acres
of federal land.90
The continued conflict, however, provoked a backlash within rural
communities and the livestock industry. In the 1970s and 80s, ranchers involved in
the “Sagebrush Rebellion” sought to transfer federal rangelands to state or private
82

43 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(2).
Id. § 1901(a)(1).
84
Id. §§ 1903–1904.
85
See George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management IV:
FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENV’T L. 1, 81 (1983) (“[T]he BLM’s
only statutory management mandate until 1976 was the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934.”).
86
Forest Service grazing policies are based on the 1897 Organic Act, the 1960 Multiple
Use Sustained Yield Act, the 1976 National Forest Management Act, and the Wilderness
Act. Despite the multiple-use mandates under the MUSYA, the courts have provided great
deference to the Forest Service in managing grazing levels, even upholding a Forest Service
decision to allocate 100% of forage to livestock use and none to wild ungulates. See Forest
Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1100 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A]llocating available
forage to livestock and monitoring the use of the land is consistent with the Forest Plan, and
is neither arbitrary nor capricious.”).
87
See NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 153–57.
88
Id. at 156–57.
89
Id. at 160.
90
Leshy & McUsic, supra note 28, at 376 n.28 (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council v.
Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1048 (D. Nev. 1985), aff’d, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987)).
83
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ownership in response to federal regulations and land-use decisions perceived as
threatening western ranching.91 More recently, ranchers have challenged grazing
restrictions and limits on access to water rights as unlawful and unconstitutional.92
Ranchers have further lobbied against environmental regulations and reductions in
grazing they perceive as threatening their business and way of life.93
Parties on both sides have relatively little to show for all the time and resources
devoted to these decades of conflict. The National Wildlife Federation, for instance,
has criticized political and litigation tactics as “generat[ing] a great deal of
controversy, but only a small amount of change” in grazing practices.94 Judi Brower,
an attorney with WildEarth Guardians, historically one of the most frequent litigants
against grazing, has described lobbying and litigation as “a no-win for everyone.”95
Moreover, either side’s victory in an individual dispute may prove only temporary
if similar conflict reemerges when the permit comes up for renewal, a new species
is listed under the Endangered Species Act, or the relevant agency simply decides to
reconsider an earlier decision.96 Without another tool to resolve conflicts between
grazing and conservation, we are at what John D. Leshy and Molly S. McUsic have
called “a kind of uneasy stalemate,” with little or no opportunity for groups to
cooperatively resolve disputes over the use of public rangelands.97

91

See NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 167.
See, e.g., Estate of Hage v. United States, 687 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (arguing
that limits on access to water rights constitutes a federal taking).
93
See, e.g., Ranchers Applaud Announcement of New NEPA Rules, PUB. LANDS
COUNCIL (Jan. 9, 2020), https://publiclandscouncil.org/2020/01/09/ranchers-applaudannouncement-of-new-nepa-rules/ [https://perma.cc/FWP5-99JT] (supporting rolling back
NEPA rules that created “onerous processes and bureaucratic red tape”); Jennifer Yachnin,
Could Conservation Plan Prompt Tougher Grazing Oversight?, E&E NEWS (Nov. 1, 2021,
1:29
PM),
https://www.eenews.net/articles/could-conservation-plan-prompt-toughergrazing-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/EY5M-ZRUB].
94
About the Program, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, https://www.nwf.org/WCR/About
[https://perma.cc/Z8ME-732C] (last visited Aug. 7, 2022).
95
See Regan, supra note 19.
96
See id.; see also, e.g., Press Release, Center for Biological Diversity, Lawsuit Targets
Trump Administration Renewal of Oregon Ranchers’ Grazing Permit (May 13, 2019),
https://biologicaldiversity.org/w/news/press-releases/lawsuit-targets-renewal-of-oregon-ran
cher-grazing-permit-2019-05-13/ [https://perma.cc/Q7YX-KXNH]; John Bowman, Cattle
Grazing Permit Renewal Halted on Marble Mountain Land, PROVIDENCE J. (July 1, 2012,
1:07 PM), https://www.providencejournal.com/story/news/2012/04/12/cattle-grazingpermit-renewal-halted/49496937007/ [https://perma.cc/8M5H-5D4N]; John Leshy, A
Trump Plan Breaks a Great Deal for Ranchers and Park Lovers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/03/opinion/environment-ranchers-trump.html [https://pe
rma.cc/5BKB-NMJ8].
97
Leshy & McUsic, supra note 28, at 376.
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II. MARKETS FOR VOLUNTARY CONSERVATION ON FEDERAL GRAZING LANDS
This conflict over federal grazing lands stands in sharp relief to similar conflicts
on private lands. While there is some litigation against private landowners over
environmental impacts,98 the inefficiencies of litigation have often encouraged
conservation interests to instead prioritize incentives and voluntary approaches.
Nationwide, land trusts have conserved habitat, water quality, and other
environmental values by acquiring private land and dedicating it to conservation.99
They have also pursued these goals through conservation easements that
permanently limit future development of private lands while, often, keeping them in
agricultural or livestock production.100 According to the Land Trust Alliance, 61
million acres were conserved by these methods as of 2020, with approximately 25%
of the acreage conserved since 2010.101
In many other cases, conservation groups seek to influence ranching on private
lands without asking landowners to permanently cede property rights, which many
are reluctant to do. In Montana’s Paradise Valley, for instance, conservation groups
partnered with a Paradise Valley rancher on the state’s first elk occupancy
agreement.102 Elk migrating from Yellowstone National Park impose costs on
private landowners by consuming forage and risking the spread of brucellosis, a
wildlife disease in the region that can be transmitted from elk to cattle.103 This risk
makes elk a source of conflict between ranchers, hunters, and conservation interests.
The agreement seeks to solve conflict between elk and cattle and reduce disease

98
See, e.g., Cascadia Wildlands v. Scott Timber Co., No. 6:16-CV-01710-AA, 2022
WL 3017684 (D. Or. July 29, 2022) (bringing an action against two private timber
companies); Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t, Inc. v. Cow Palace, LLC, 80 F. Supp.
3d 1180 (E.D. Wash. 2015) (bringing an action against commercial dairy owners).
99
See Parker, supra note 15; see also Alex Brown, Private Lands Are the Next
Battleground in State Conservation Policy, PEW: STATELINE (Apr. 26, 2022),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2022/04/26/privatelands-are-the-next-battleground-in-state-conservation-policy
[https://perma.cc/TY2FW4H8].
100
See Brown, supra note 99.
101
Press Release, Land Trust All., 61 Million Acres Voluntarily Conserved in America,
2020 National Land Trust Census Report Reveals (Dec. 8, 2021),
https://www.landtrustalliance.org/61-million-acres-voluntarily-conserved-america-2020national-land-trust-census-report-reveals [https://perma.cc/YLW7-RNVE].
102
See Elk Occupancy Agreements, supra note 21.
103
See Arthur D. Middleton, Temple Stoellinger, Drew E. Bennett, Travis Brammer,
Laura Gigliotti, Hilary Byerly Flint, Sam Maher & Bryan Leonard, The Role of Private Lands
in Conserving Yellowstone’s Wildlife in the Twenty-First Century, 22 WYO. L. REV. 237,
241 (2022); see also Nathaniel D. Rayl , Jerod A. Merkle, Kelly M. Proffitt, Emily S.
Almberg, Jennifer D. Jones, Justin A. Gude & Paul C. Cross, Elk Migration Influences the
Risk of Disease Spillover in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, 90 J. ANIMAL ECOL. 1264,
1265 (2021).
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transmission risk by compensating the rancher for separating elk and cattle and
conserving 500 acres of elk winter habitat.104
In North Central Montana, the Nature Conservancy operates its 60,000-acre
Matador Ranch as a grassbank for local ranchers.105 Those ranchers pay a discounted
fee to graze their cattle on the bank in exchange for adopting conservation practices
on their own land to control noxious weeds and avoid “sodbusting.”106 Fees are
discounted further for ranchers who install wildlife-friendly fences and take other
steps to conserve prairie dogs, sage grouse, and other wildlife.107
States, too, often resolve similar trade-offs through market-like mechanisms.
Upon statehood, Congress gave land to western states in trust to fund schools and
other public services.108 Many of these state trust lands are leased for grazing and
other uses.109 However, western states are typically required to use trust lands to
maximize benefits to the beneficiary.110 For parcels with high conservation values,
conservation interests may be able to simply outbid other would-be users and obtain
a conservation lease that precludes other uses and may even facilitate environmental
improvement of the property.111 In August 2021, for example, the environmental
group Western Watersheds Project was the high bidder on a 624-acre state grazing
lease in Idaho’s Sawtooth Valley, which the group says it will put to “conservation
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See sources cited supra note 103.
The Matador Ranch, NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://www.nature.org/en-us/getinvolved/how-to-help/places-we-protect/matador-ranch/
[https://perma.cc/GB7T-77LU]
(last visited Sept. 13, 2022).
106
Id.
107
Id.; see also Laura Huggins, Contracting for Conservation, 36 PROP. & ENV’T RSCH.
CTR. REPORTS 44, 44–45 (2017), https://perc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/PERCRepor
ts-Summer2017-hirez.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZZ8-X89N] (describing American Prairie’s
“Wild Sky” program, which funds incentive payments to Montana ranchers who adopt
wildlife-friendly practices).
108
See PETER W. CULP, DIANE B. CONRADI & CYNTHIA C. TUELL, TRUST LANDS IN THE
AMERICAN WEST: A LEGAL OVERVIEW AND POLICY ASSESSMENT 2–3 (Jennifer A. Barefoot,
ed. 2005), http://opportunitylinkmt.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Trust-Lands-in-theAmerican-West.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QBY-NYNY].
109
Id. at 55 (noting that state trust lands “are actively managed for a diverse range of
uses, including timbering, grazing, mining, agriculture, oil and gas, residential and
commercial developments, conservation, and recreational uses such as hiking, fishing and
hunting.”).
110
See generally CULP ET AL., supra note 108 (giving an overview of each western
state’s approach to trust land management); see also Leonard & Regan, Legal and
Institutional Barriers, supra note 16, at 156–59 (explaining that unlike federal grazing
permits, leases to state trust lands are generally allocated through competitive bidding).
111
Leonard & Regan, Legal and Institutional Barriers, supra note 16, at 156–59; see
also Forest Guardians v. Wells, 34 P.3d 364, 370–71 (Ariz. 2001); Idaho Watersheds Project
v. State Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 982 P.2d 371 (Idaho 1999).
105
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use” for the next twenty years.112 Such arrangements are growing increasingly
common on state trust lands as conservation and recreation demand grows.113
This approach has also been applied, with success, outside the landconservation context. In recent decades, many western states have recognized
leaving water in streams to maintain flows and conserve fish habitat as a “beneficial
use” sufficient to maintain water rights under the prior appropriation doctrine.114
Prior to this change, western water law was based on historical “use it or lose it”
rules.115 If the owner of a water right failed to use all of the water covered by their
right, another user was free to use the water and the owner could see their right
reduced.116 Recognizing in-stream flow rights has opened up the potential for water
markets to resolve conflicting demands over water.117 Today, under certain
conditions and to varying degrees depending on the state, water rights can be traded
and put to conservation uses, such as instream flows for fish and wildlife habitat.118
Due to dissatisfaction with the lobbying and litigation stalemate over federal
grazing lands, there is growing interest in new tools and approaches for conservation
interests to conserve wildlife and other natural resources on public lands.119 Before
112
Press Release, W. Watersheds Project, Western Watersheds Project Wins Grazing
Lease in Sawtooth Valley (Aug. 18, 2021), https://www.westernwatersheds.org/2021/08/
western-watersheds-project-wins-grazing-lease-in-sawtooth-valley/ [https://perma.cc/36BH
-2CLL].
113
See Sally K. Fairfax & Andrea Issod, Trust Principles as a Tool for Grazing Reform:
Learning from Four State Cases, 33 ENV’T L. 341 (2003) (discussing detailed case studies
in Arizona, New Mexico, Idaho, and Oregon in which environmental groups have attempted
to bid against ranchers to acquire the rights to lands formerly used for grazing).
114
Leonard & Regan, Legal and Institutional Barriers, supra note 16, at 172–78.
115
See Laura Ziemer, Timothy Hawkes, Michelle Bryan & Kevin Rechkoff, How the
West Is Won: Advancing Water Law for Watershed Health, 42 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV.
81, 82–83 (2020) (describing how “the tide has begun to turn” such that “more places are
harnessing the same human ingenuity that built the West to modernize water law and restore
degraded habitats.”); see also Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Environmental Flows in the Rocky
Mountain West: A Progress Report, 9 WYO. L. REV. 335, 336 (2009) (noting that “[s]tate
water laws have adjusted in varying degrees to acknowledge demand for protection of
environmental flows”).
116
See MacDonnell, supra note 115.
117
See BRANDON SCARBOROUGH, PROP. & ENV’T RSCH. CTR., PERC POL’Y SERIES NO.
46, ENVIRONMENTAL WATER MARKETS: RESTORING STREAMS THROUGH TRADE 12–18
(Roger Meiners ed., 2010), https://www.perc.org/wp-content/uploads/old/ps46.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ELA-32KK].
118
Id.
119
See, e.g., Leonard et al., Allow “Nonuse Rights,” supra note 16; Justin R. Pidot &
Ezekiel A. Peterson, Conservation Rights-of-Way on Public Lands, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
89 (2021) (suggesting how the Bureau of Land Management could issue conservation rightsof-way to maintain wildlife habitat); Temple Stoellinger, Heidi J. Albers, Arthur Middleton,
Jason F. Shogren & Robert Bonnie, Where the Deer and the Antelope Play: Conserving Big
Game Migrations as an Endangered Phenomena, 31 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 81 (2020)
(discussing how economic decision frameworks and incentive-based tools can conserve big
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examining policy barriers and potential pathways to allow markets for voluntary
conservation on federal grazing lands, it is useful to outline (A) the benefits of
allowing voluntary conservation on federal grazing lands, the myriad options
voluntary conservation would give ranchers and conservation groups to resolve their
differences, and the extent of interest in these tools among conservation
organizations, and (B) common objections to this approach.
A. The Case for Allowing Markets for Voluntary Conservation
Opening markets for voluntary conservation on federal grazing lands has
several advantages over the status quo. At a basic level, such exchanges are, by
definition, mutually beneficial for the parties involved. A conservation organization
that negotiates with a rancher is engaging in a voluntary market exchange that
generates benefits for both the rancher and environmental group; otherwise, the deal
would not occur.120 This stands in stark contrast to grazing disputes involving
litigation, regulation, or administrative processes in which both parties expend
resources in such a way that one side’s “win” is another side’s “loss”—and when
the costs of participating in those processes are considered, it’s possible that both
sides could ultimately lose. Thus, the decision to negotiate represents a
fundamentally different approach that has the potential to generate more positivesum outcomes for the parties involved.
Voluntary conservation through markets also has the potential to deliver more
durable conservation outcomes than the status quo. Unlike lobbying or litigation
“victories,” voluntary agreements between ranchers and conservation groups are
likely less vulnerable to changing political conditions that might otherwise influence
how rangelands are managed. Such an approach also allows conservation priorities
to adapt more easily to new environmental conditions such as climate change or to
respond to emerging resource conflicts such as those stemming from increased
recreation on public rangelands. And it is also a fairer, more pragmatic way to
advance conservation that respects ranchers’ long history of grazing these lands,
including by compensating them for changes to grazing practices that advance
conservation.
Another key benefit of this market approach is that it is not limited to one tool
for resolving grazing conflicts but would open a larger toolbox of arrangements
between ranchers and conservation groups. Despite the obstacles impeding this
market discussed below,121 ranchers and conservation groups are already
experimenting with some of these tools. Perhaps the most common approach to date
has been conservation groups “buying out” the permits of ranchers looking to exit

game migrations); Leshy & McUsic, supra note 28; see also Nelson, Reform Grazing Policy,
supra note 18, at 656–67.
120
For a discussion of examples in the public-land grazing context, see Leonard &
Regan, Legal and Institutional Barriers, supra note 16, at 151–56. For examples in the
Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, see Middleton et al., supra note 103, at 289–90.
121
See infra Part IV.
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the livestock industry or relocate their operations.122 Interest in voluntary buyouts
stems in part from frustrations among environmentalists with the standard approach
of litigation or administrative actions to curtail grazing on federal lands.123 Some
buyout advocates, such as the environmentalist Andy Kerr, have referred to buyouts
as “easier” and “more just” than political or legal wrangling.124 Others view offering
compensation to ranchers as a way to more effectively reduce conflicts on federal
lands and as a more pragmatic approach to achieve conservation goals.125
For example, WildEarth Guardians has negotiated buyouts with ranchers on
28,000 acres of the Gila National Forest in New Mexico.126 To facilitate these
buyouts, the group negotiates a private agreement with a rancher and then, since it
has no intention to graze under the permits, petitions the Forest Service to amend
land-use plans to close the allotments to grazing.127 Similarly, the National Wildlife
Federation has bought out ranchers’ grazing permits in the Greater Yellowstone
Ecosystem to reduce conflicts between livestock and large carnivores such as wolves
and grizzly bears, as well as to avoid disease transmission between domestic sheep
herds and wild bighorn sheep populations.128
122
See, e.g., Andy Kerr, Removing Hoofed Locusts from the Public Trough, WALLOWA
CNTY. CHIEFTAIN (Aug. 15, 1996), http://www.andykerr.net/chieftain-column-2/
[https://perma.cc/T275-NA5C] (arguing that “[a] permittee should be able to sell the grazing
privilege to anyone: another rancher or to an environmental group who could elect to retire
the permit in favor of salmon and elk or plenty and poetry”); see also Mark Salvo & Andy
Kerr, The National Public Lands Grazing Campaign, WILD EARTH, Fall/Winter 2001–2002,
at 83–84. Most recently, in 2020, Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) introduced the Voluntary
Permit Retirement Act with the support of major environmental groups including the Sierra
Club, Natural Resource Defense Council, and Defenders of Wildlife. The proposed bill
would not allow permits to be held for nonuse; rather, it would allow grazing permit holders
to relinquish permits in exchange for compensation by private parties (e.g., environmental
groups) and would then direct federal agencies to permanently retire the associated grazing
allotment. Related proposals have been put forth by legal scholars and other federal land
policy experts. See Leshy & McUsic, supra note 28, at 388 (advocating for legislation that
“directs the responsible federal agency to retire federal land from grazing permanently if the
holder of the federal permit requests it”); see also Nelson, Reform Grazing Policy, supra
note 18, at 649–50 (calling for the creation of tradable “forage rights” on federal rangelands).
123
See, e.g., Regan, supra note 19.
124
See Kerr, supra note 122.
125
See, e.g., Regan, supra note 19; see also About the Program, NAT’L WILDLIFE
FED’N, https://www.nwf.org/WCR/About [https://perma.cc/Z8ME-732C] (last visited Aug.
7, 2022).
126
Grazing Permit Retirement, WILDEARTH GUARDIANS, https://wildearthguardians.
org/public-lands/greater-gila/grazing-permit-retirement/ [https://perma.cc/A8DR-GMKT]
(last visited Aug. 7, 2022).
127
Under this approach, the allotment is not permanently retired and could be reopened
by the agency in a future land management plan. See Leonard & Regan, Legal and
Institutional Barriers, supra note 16, at 154–56.
128
Since 2002, the National Wildlife Federation has retired more than 1.5 million acres
of wildlife habitat through its Adopt-A-Wildlife Acre program throughout the Northern and
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In other cases, conservation groups have sought not to end grazing on federal
lands but to change the type of livestock to produce conservation benefits. The
nonprofit American Prairie, for example, has acquired BLM grazing permits in
eastern Montana, which it uses to sustain its herd of privately owned bison, as part
of a broader strategy to restore a large prairie ecosystem to benefit wildlife.129
Ultimately, the group wants to acquire private rangelands and federal grazing
permits to support a 3.2 million-acre wildlife reserve, which would be the largest in
the lower forty-eight states.130 The National Wildlife Federation has also paid
ranchers to convert their grazing permits from sheep to cattle to reduce the risk of
disease transmission between domestic and wild sheep.131 A similar approach has
also been proposed to address the wild horse crisis.132
In still other cases, conservation groups have provided incentives to ranchers to
adjust grazing practices to produce conservation benefits. In 2022, for instance, the
National Wildlife Federation, Greater Yellowstone Coalition, and Property and
Environment Research Center partnered with a rancher in the Greater Yellowstone
Ecosystem to help the rancher acquire a grazing permit from an existing permittee
in an area that is a hotspot for grizzly bears.133 In exchange for this help, the rancher
will implement grazing practices that reduce the risk of livestock-grizzly bear
Southern Rockies, including nearly 700,000 acres in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.
Adopt a Wildlife Acre Program, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, https://www.nwf.org/OurWork/Our-Lands/Adopt-a-Wildlife-Acre [https://perma.cc/WT7Z-RVFA] (last visited Aug.
7, 2022); Robert B. Keiter, The Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem Revisited: Law, Science, and
the Pursuit of Ecosystem Management in an Iconic Landscape, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 142–
43 (2020).
129
See Leonard & Regan, Legal and Institutional Barriers, supra note 16, at 151–54.
130
See Building American Prairie FAQs, AM. PRAIRIE, https://www.americanprairie.
org/building-the-reserve-faqs [https://perma.cc/3473-2NQ4] (last visited Aug. 7, 2022);
James L. Huffman, American Prairie Reserve: Protecting Wildlife Habitat on a Grand Scale,
59 NAT. RES. J. 35, 35 (2019). American Prairie’s attempts to use federal grazing permits for
bison grazing has recently attracted opposition in Montana, including several legal
challenges that question BLM’s authority to issue grazing permits for the conservation
group’s non-production herd of bison. See Amanda Eggert, Turf War, MONTANA FREE PRESS
(Aug. 31, 2022), https://montanafreepress.org/2022/08/31/cattle-producers-gianforteappeal-blm-bison-grazing-decision/ (quoting arguments from the State of Montana that “[a]
non-production herd of bison is not considered ‘livestock’ under applicable federal law and
BLM cannot issue the permit [American Prairie] seeks”).
131
Kit Fischer, NWF Protecting Bighorn Sheep in the High Divide, NAT. WILDLIFE
FED’N BLOG (Sept. 16, 2019), https://blog.nwf.org/2019/09/nwf-protecting-bighorn-sheepin-the-high-divide/ [https://perma.cc/47U6-6S3S].
132
See Vanessa Elizondo, Timothy Fitzgerald & Randal R. Rucker, You Can’t Drag
Them Away: An Economic Analysis of the Wild Horse and Burro Program, 41 J. AGRIC. &
RES. ECON. 1, 18 (2016) (explaining that wild horses and burros often compete with domestic
livestock for limited forage resources on federal rangelands, but in many areas, the horse and
burro population has grown far beyond the range’s capacity to support them).
133
Personal correspondence with Kit Fischer (National Wildlife Federation), Brooke
Shifrin (Greater Yellowstone Coalition), and Brian Yablonski (PERC) (Aug. 11, 2022) (on
file with the authors).
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conflicts, including adjusting how many cattle graze the allotment, where the cattle
graze, and when the cattle graze.134 Ultimately, the goal of the partnership is to
reduce the number of grizzlies lethally removed from the area due to livestock
depredation.135
Others have recently suggested similar rights-based approaches to allow
voluntary conservation of wildlife migration corridors. The U.S. Department of
Agriculture and the State of Wyoming recently partnered to support voluntary
conservation of private working lands and migratory big-game species using
conservation leases through the Grassland Conservation Reserve Program.136
Another proposal relies on federal agencies’ authority to issue “rights-of-way”
across federal lands and envisions that conservation groups would acquire such a
right in the path of migrating ungulates and other species and, thereby, protect the
corridor from development that conflicts with conservation of these corridors.137
These examples and proposals are notable because, as discussed below, federal
policy is not set up to facilitate them but to discourage them (often
unintentionally).138 Therefore, ranchers and conservation groups that have pursued
these approaches have either creatively worked around policy constraints or taken a
significant risk that their agreement would ultimately be frustrated by the relevant
agency.
B. Anxieties About this Market
Despite the advantages of resolving grazing conflicts through markets, many of
the examples described above, and policy proposals to make markets easier to
replicate, have been controversial. In particular, the livestock industry and rural
communities have generally opposed permit buyouts and other arrangements that
would remove or reduce commercial livestock grazing from federal rangelands,
citing concerns about the broader economic and social consequences of this shift in
land use.139 In some cases, past buyouts have attracted local political controversy
and put pressure on federal managers to reopen and restock grazing allotments that
were previously bought out by environmental organizations.140 Federal land
134

Id.
Id.
136
See USDA Commits to Big Game Conservation Partnership with the State of
Wyoming: Initial Investments Forthcoming, USDA: NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV. WYO.
(May 20, 2022), https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/wy/newsroom/releases/
?cid=NRCSEPRD1927621 [https://perma.cc/HT6N-UQSM].
137
Pidot & Peterson, supra note 119, at 135.
138
See infra Part IV.
139
See, e.g., Leshy & McUsic, supra note 28, at 385–88.
140
Id. at 385–86 (discussing the Grand Canyon Trust’s purchase of grazing permits in
the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument and the resulting political controversy);
see also Mike Koshmrl, ‘Bought Out’ Grazing Lands Could Be Restocked, JACKSON HOLE
NEWS & GUIDE (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.jhnewsandguide.com/news/environmental/bou
ght-out-grazing-lands-could-be-restocked/article_34efa9f8-b4bb-5c02-bb35-d804c3c9243b
135
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managers and others have also objected to private arrangements that purport to
decide how federal lands will be used—a decision that managers view as their
prerogative.141
Rural communities and livestock-reliant industries have expressed concerns
about at least some of the arrangements that might be facilitated by markets for
voluntary conservation on federal rangelands, especially buyouts.142 Throughout
much of the American West, economic activity in rural communities is centered
around agriculture or livestock production.143 The prospect of taking livestocksupporting federal lands out of production for future livestock grazing causes
concerns for many in those communities, given that those lands are often critical to
sustaining economically viable ranches in the arid West, where deeded landholdings
alone are typically too small to support a livestock operation.144 Opposition to
buyouts also stems from a concern that well-funded environmental organizations or
high-net-worth individuals could purchase many leases and choose to remove them
from development with little or no input from the affected local communities.145
.html [https://perma.cc/6ZRP-GKHZ] (discussing the recent case of bought-out allotments
in the Bridger-Teton National Forest that may be reopened to livestock grazing).
141
See, e.g., FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RANGELAND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTIVES UPDATES [hereinafter DIRECTIVES UPDATES], https://www.fs.fed.us/rangelandmanagement/documents/directives/RangelandMgmtDirectivesUpdates-508.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/XJ25-H5UH] (last visited Aug. 7, 2022) (noting the U.S. Forest Service’s desire to
adopt a policy against third-party grazing permit buyouts to external groups in order “to
maintain the agency’s authority and responsibility into the future” and that the proposed
policy would clarify that such arrangements “must NOT [sic] be assigned to only satisfy the
request of an external third party or entity who has no legal authority to manage National
Forest System lands”).
142
For a discussion of the controversies associated with large-scale acquisitions of rural
lands and federal leases for conservation purposes, see Shawn Regan, Where the Buffalo
Roam: Rewilding the American Serengeti, 10 BREAKTHROUGH J. 66, 66–82 (2019)
[hereinafter Regan, Where the Buffalo Roam].
143
See Swette & Lambin, supra note 8, at 2.
144
See Stewart v. Kempthorne, 554 F.3d 1245, 1254 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The Counties
argue that they will suffer financially from a decline in the range-fed cattle industry, and that
the BLM’s issuance of grazing permits to Canyonlands ‘effectively eliminate[s] livestock
grazing’ in the area. In making this argument, the Counties suggest that a decrease in
livestock grazing decreases the tax revenues generated through sales and property taxes, thus
injuring the Counties. The Counties further argue that a decrease in livestock grazing injures
the aesthetic appeal of the Counties and will hamper their ability to provide for the health,
safety, and welfare of their citizens.” (citations omitted)).
145
In the 2000 U.S. Supreme Court decision Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, which
addressed the 1994 revision to the BLM’s grazing regulations, the ranchers challenging the
revisions cited their concern that reducing the qualifications necessary to be a livestock
permittee “is part of a scheme to end livestock grazing on the public lands.” 529 U.S. 728,
747 (2000) (stating that “individuals or organizations owning small quantities of stock [will]
acquire grazing permits, even though they intend not to graze at all or to graze only a nominal
number of livestock—all the while excluding others from using the public range for grazing.”
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If successful, there is concern that large-scale acquisitions of this kind could
have far-reaching effects on local communities that have long relied on ranching as
the primary form of rural economic activity.146 To the extent that buyouts or
conservation leasing result in less ranching or agriculture in a region, large-scale
acquisitions could have other economic effects on rural communities, such as a
decline in other local industries or businesses that supply inputs that support
ranching and agriculture.147 Similarly, rural communities have expressed concern
that a shift from commercial agriculture to conservation would reduce tax revenues
for local governments, thereby making public services more difficult to afford.148
Some also view livestock grazing as an important form of rangeland
management and contend that removing livestock from grazing allotments could
have negative ecological consequences, especially if grazing was permanently
excluded.149 Targeted, properly managed livestock grazing may be used as a form
of wildfire mitigation, to achieve certain vegetation management objectives, or to
sustain natural ecological processes.150 Moreover, to the extent that permit buyouts

(alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 47–48)); see also Kathleen Epstein,
Julia H. Haggerty & Hannah Gosnell, With, Not for, Money: Ranch Management
Trajectories of the Super-Rich in Greater Yellowstone, 112 ANNALS AM. ASS’N
GEOGRAPHERS 432 (2021) (discussing the social and ecological implications of the recent
growth in ranch ownership by high-net-worth individuals).
146
For a discussion of the controversies associated with large-scale acquisitions of rural
lands and federal leases for conservation purposes in the context of the American Prairie,
see, e.g., Regan, Where the Buffalo Roam, supra note 142.
147
See Swette & Lambin, supra note 8, at 2 (“The role of working landscapes in
supporting rural prosperity, protecting against habitat fragmentation, and providing natural
climate solutions could be undermined by a loss of ranching. Researchers speculate about
the possibility of a tipping point, such that once a critical mass of ranches is lost, ranching is
no longer viable because of the loss of key infrastructure and community benefits provided
by a network of ranches.”).
148
See Mark Steinbach & Jack Ward Thomas, Potential Outcomes and Consequence
of a Proposed Grazing Permit Buyout Program, 60 RANGELAND ECOLOGY & MGMT. 36, 42
(2007).
149
See Press Release, Pub. Lands Council, Ranchers Urge Congress to Oppose
Voluntary Grazing Permit Retirement Act (Jan. 31, 2020), https://publiclandscouncil.org/20
20/01/31/ranchers-urge-congress-to-oppose-voluntary-grazing-permit-retirement-act/ [https
://perma.cc/K5P3-EGH5] (“‘Grazing is an essential and irreplaceable tool for federal land
managers,’ said fifth-generation Oregon rancher and PLC President Bob Skinner. ‘Depriving
them of this tool—the oldest of the multiple-uses—in order to placate the unfounded
demands of radical environmentalists would be detrimental to the overall health of these
landscapes and is entirely inconsistent with the original intent of both the Taylor Grazing
Act and the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act.’”).
150
See, e.g., Derek W. Bailey, Jeffrey C. Mosley, Richard E. Estell, Andres F. Cibils,
Marc Horney, John R. Hendrickson, John W. Walker, Karen L. Launchbaugh & Elizabeth
A. Burritt, Synthesis Paper: Targeted Livestock Grazing: Prescription for Healthy
Rangelands, 72 RANGELAND ECOLOGY & MGMT. 865, 865–66 (2019).
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contribute to the subdivision of large working ranches, they could have negative
effects on wildlife habitat, open space, and other natural amenities.151
Some, including federal agency officials, have also suggested that
arrangements between ranchers and conservation groups intrude on agencies’
authority to manage federal lands, although this concern appears primarily limited
to buyouts that purport to be permanent.152 An example of this type of concern was
expressed by a representative of the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association in 2020
after legislation was introduced in Congress that would have facilitated voluntary,
permanent grazing-permit retirements; at the time, he told a public radio station
reporter, “I don’t think that federal land management policy should be taken away
from those line officers and range conservationists at the BLM and Forest Service
in favor of third-party entities with their own agenda.”153
Likewise, under the Trump Administration, the Forest Service proposed
adopting an official policy regarding buyouts that stated that “[f]inancial
arrangements made between third parties purporting to determine the status and
management of [National Forest System] lands will not be acknowledged,
sanctioned, or accepted by the Forest Service.”154 The agency indicated that buyouts
undermine the Forest Service’s management authority and emphasized that thirdparty groups have no legal authority to manage national forest system lands.155
Relatedly, ranchers have asserted it would be unfair to allow buyouts to
permanently remove livestock from federal grazing allotments,156 while ranchers’
151

See, e.g., Claire A. Runge, Andrew J. Plantinga, Ashley E. Larsen, David E. Naugle,
Kate J. Helmstedt, Stephen Polasky, J. Patrick Donnelly, Joseph T. Smith, Tyler J. Lark &
Joshua L. Lawler et al., Unintended Habitat Loss on Private Land from Grazing Restrictions
on Public Rangelands, 56 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 52, 58–60 (2019) (finding that restricting
grazing on federal lands can have the unintended consequence of increasing the conversion
of private rangeland to cropland, causing greater land fragmentation of sage-grouse habitat).
See also DREW E. BENNETT & TESSA WITTMAN, U. WYO. RUCKELSHAUS INSTITUTE OF
ENV’T & NAT. RES., COWS OR CONDOS: RANCHER AND LAND-USE OUTCOMES FOLLOWING
COMPENSATED FEDERAL GRAZING PERMIT WAIVERS 15 (Aug. 2022), http://www.uwyo.edu/
haub/ruckelshaus-institute/publications/_files/cvc-report.pdf (finding no evidence that
federal grazing permit retirements are driving subdivision of private lands).
152
See, e.g., DIRECTIVES UPDATES, supra note 141.
153
Nate Hegyi, Proposed Law Would Make It Easier to Remove Livestock from Public
Lands, KUNC (Jan. 31, 2020, 5:38 PM), https://www.kunc.org/2020-01-31/proposed-lawwould-make-it-easier-to-remove-livestock-from-public-lands
[https://perma.cc/NRY9TCFZ].
154
See FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK 2209.13–
GRAZING PERMIT ADMINISTRATION HANDBOOK § 13.7 (2020), https://www.fs.fed.us/range
land-management/documents/directives/FSH2209-13-CH10-Proposed.pdf [https://perma.cc
/2U46-FQBZ] [hereinafter Proposed FSH 2209.13].
155
Id.
156
Cf. April Reese, The Big Buyout, High Country News (April 4, 2005),
https://www.hcn.org/issues/295/15398 [https://perma.cc/T8G2-WYEE] (noting opposition
from cattlemen’s associations to bills that would allow buyouts of federal grazing permits,
and quoting one rancher as noting that “ranchers don’t want this permanency . . . . Once it’s
gone, it’s gone”).
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grazing permits do not similarly confer a permanent or secure right to graze
livestock.157 As discussed above, ranchers are granted temporary, ten-year grazing
privileges, which can be reduced or revoked by federal agencies.158 Thus, in this
way, authorizing voluntary buyouts (if permanent) may unfairly tip the scales in
favor of conservation interests, who would be able to remove livestock from
allotments in perpetuity, while still only providing weak or insecure grazing rights
to ranchers.159
Finally, others portray grazing permit buyouts as a tool that environmentalists
use only after they have already weakened ranchers’ federal grazing privileges
through environmental litigation and regulations.160 In this view, permit values are
already significantly diminished from legal challenges and other administrative
efforts to undermine grazing rights, and buyouts are often a last-ditch effort to
remove livestock from federal rangelands, not a good-faith, market-based tool to
resolve conflicting demands.
These concerns have likely hindered U.S. grazing policy from evolving in ways
that can more directly accommodate environmental values through market
exchange. In addition to the legal barriers to voluntary conservation on federal
grazing lands described below, this has maintained a status quo in which conflicting
demands over the use of public rangelands are pitted against each other in legal or
political arenas rather than resolved cooperatively through market exchanges.
III. BARRIERS TO MARKETS FOR VOLUNTARY CONSERVATION ON FEDERAL
GRAZING LANDS
Currently, the U.S. grazing institution erects substantial legal barriers to
markets for voluntary conservation on federal grazing lands, including (A) the
requirement to own or control base property; (B) the requirement of stock
ownership; (C) the requirement to actively use the permit for grazing; and (D) the
lack of agency permanent retirement authority. Each barrier is discussed below.
A. Ownership or Control of Base Property
Both the BLM and the Forest Service require that grazing permittees own “base
property,” usually a farm or ranch near the federal allotment that serves as a base of
operations. In the desert southwest, a water right is often the base property used to
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See Lorraine M. Egan & Myles J. Watts, Some Costs of Incomplete Property Rights
with Regard to Federal Grazing Permits, 74 LAND ECON. 171, 183 (1998).
158
See supra Part II.
159
Id.
160
For one example of this view, see Myron Ebell, Opinion, Ranchers Harassed Off
Their Land, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2014, 3:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424052702304518704579522022773686390 [https://perma.cc/QYM4-VNCS].
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obtain a grazing permit.161 These requirements are a barrier to at least some types of
market agreements for voluntary conservation on federal grazing lands.
By regulation, the Forest Service has had a base property requirement since
1905, which was originally intended to prevent “the herds of nonresidents,” namely
Texas cattle barons, from destroying the pasture.162 At the time, President Theodore
Roosevelt believed the policy adopted by the Forest Service was “among the most
potent influences in favor of the actual home-maker.”163 Today, Forest Service
regulations limit grazing permits “to persons who own livestock to be grazed and
such base property as may be required.”164 These regulations further define base
property as “land and improvements owned and used by the permittee for a farm or
ranch operation and specifically designated by him to qualify for a term grazing
permit.”165 The Forest Service Handbook elaborates that base property should
“produce a part of the annual forage crop needed to support the permitted livestock
over a yearlong period as determined by the Regional Forester.”166
161

See FOREST SERV. & BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., GRAZING ADMINISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS AND PROCESSES 2, https://www.fs.fed.us/rangeland-management/documen
ts/grazing/BLMGrazingAdministrationRequirementsProcesses201708.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7ACW-9EWA] (last visited Aug. 7, 2022).
162
ROWLEY, supra note 36, at 62
163
Id. (quoting Letter from Theodore Roosevelt, President, U.S., to James Wilson,
Sec’y of Agric., Dep’t of Agric. (Dec. 21, 1905)).
164
36 C.F.R. § 222.3(c)(1)(i) (“Except as provided for by the Chief, Forest Service,
paid term permits will be issued to persons who own livestock to be grazed and such base
property as may be required, provided the land is determined to be available for grazing
purposes by the Chief, Forest Service, and the capacity exists to graze specified numbers of
animals.”).
165
Id. § 222.1(b)(3). The Forest Service grazing regulations note that “if a permittee
chooses to dispose of all or part of his base property or permitted livestock (not under
approved nonuse) but does not choose to waive his term permit, the Forest Supervisor will
give written notice that he no longer is qualified to hold a permit, provide he is given up to
one year to reestablish his qualifications before cancellation action is final.” Id. §
222.3(c)(1)(v).
166
FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK 2209.13—
GRAZING PERMIT ADMINISTRATION HANDBOOK, 11-15 § 12.21 (1992), https://www.fs.usda.
gov/im/directives/dughtml/fsh.html [https://perma.cc/V5A8-PE4Y] [hereinafter FSH
2209.13]. [Eds. note: Because the Forest Service website contains only links to word
documents, the Permalink appended links to a PDF compiling the sections of the FSH cited
in this article, as they existed in September 2022]. The Handbook further directs Forest
Supervisors to develop base property requirements for each National Forest after:
a. Consult[ing] with livestock operators concerning common or locally accepted
practices.
b. Consider[ing] the dependency of local livestock operators on National Forest
System lands.
c. Consider[ing] how the base property blends into the livestock operation.
d. Consider[ing] the needs of permittees.
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Modeled on Forest Service grazing regulations, the TGA incorporated the base
property requirement and allowed the Secretary to issue grazing permits only to
“bona fide settlers, residents, and other stock owners.”167 The BLM’s grazing
regulations implementing the TGA expand upon this requirement, adding that a
grazing permit holder “must own or control land or water base property.”168 The
BLM regulations define base property as “(1) [l]and that has the capability to
produce crops that can be used to support authorized livestock grazing for a specified
period of the year, or (2) water that is suitable for consumption by livestock and is
available and accessible, to the authorized livestock when the public lands are used
for livestock grazing.”169
Base property requirements artificially limit the market for grazing permits to
those who own property near the allotment or can afford to also purchase the current
permittee’s private land or water right. When a rancher wishes to sell their permit to
a conservation group, they may also have to sell their private property, which can be
a difficult choice depending on how long the property has been in their family and
how it has been used. The base property requirement also increases the cost for
conservation groups to participate in such agreements by requiring them to purchase
and hold land that may not have much value to them.170
B. Stock Ownership Requirement
The Forest Service and BLM also limit grazing permits to owners of livestock.
This too can be a barrier for some voluntary agreements to conserve federal grazing
land, such as when conservation groups wish to acquire a permit with the intent not
to graze.
Forest Service regulations limit permits to those who “own livestock to be
grazed.”171 However, the Handbook notes that in some circumstances, “it may be
desirable to modify livestock ownership requirements to encourage interest and
continuity in range livestock operations and to provide grazing opportunity for sons
or daughters of individuals grazing livestock on the National Forest System.”172
The TGA authorizes the BLM to issue grazing permits only to a settler, a
resident, or “other stock owners.”173 By implication, this limits permits to those who
e. Where leasing of ranch lands is a common local practice, giv[ing] careful
consideration to how large the ownership requirement is in relation to the total
forage needed.
Id.
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43 U.S.C. § 315b.
43 C.F.R. § 4110.1(a).
169
Id. § 4100.0-5.
170
See Leonard & Regan, Legal and Institutional Barriers, supra note 16, at 150.
171
36 C.F.R. § 222.3 (c)(1)(i). The Forest Service Handbook further requires that
“permit holder[s] must own livestock grazed on the National Forest System under grazing
permits with term status. . . .” FSH 2209.13, supra note 166, at § 12.22.
172
FSH 2209.13, supra note 166, at § 12.22.
173
43 U.S.C. § 315b (emphasis added).
168
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own livestock. In 1936, the Secretary of the Interior issued regulations confirming
this reading of the statute.174 In 1942, the Secretary of the Interior went further,
issuing a regulation limiting eligibility to those “engaged in the livestock
business.”175 That regulation remained in place until 1995, when the BLM repealed
the regulation requiring livestock ownership and that a permittee be “engaged in the
livestock business.”176 This repeal was challenged by the livestock industry and was
ultimately upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Public Lands Council v. Babbitt.177
In that case, the Supreme Court held that the TGA limits grazing permits to owners
of livestock, but not necessarily those in the livestock business, and that BLM
regulations do not need to restate all statutory requirements to be lawful.178 Thus,
any conservation group interested in purchasing a grazing permit from a willing
seller must also acquire livestock to remain eligible to hold the permit.
Depending on the conservation goal being pursued, the impact of this barrier
can vary. In eastern Montana, for instance, American Prairie purchases private
ranchlands and associated grazing permits with the aim of restoring a large prairie
ecosystem and the wildlife that depend on it.179 Rather than forgoing livestock
grazing under its permits, the organization seeks to convert the permits from one
type of livestock (cattle) to another (bison) that it believes would better help to
restore the ecosystem.180 In other cases, owning and grazing livestock may be
inconsistent with a conservation group’s objectives, making the livestock
requirement a more meaningful barrier. This barrier, however, is not necessarily a
high one, as the Tenth Circuit has previously held that ownership of just four stray
cattle is sufficient evidence of livestock ownership to obtain a grazing permit from
the BLM.181
C. Substantial Use Requirements
Once a permit is granted, BLM regulations and Forest Service regulations
require that the grazing unit actually be used for grazing, creating what, in effect, is
a “use it or lose it” requirement.182 This means that if a rancher and conservation
group agree to reduce or forego grazing on an allotment to achieve a desired
conservation outcome, they risk having the relevant agency cancel the permit in
174

Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 745 (2000).
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 746; see also Leonard & Regan, Legal and Institutional Barriers, supra note
16, at 149 (noting the grazing requirement is a “use-it-or-lose-it” policy).
179
See Huffman, supra note 130, at 36.
180
Id.
181
Stewart v. Kempthorne, 553 F.3d 1245, 1252 (10th Cir. 2009) (reaching its holding
after finding that Grand Canyon Trust/Canyonlands acquired the cattle after agreeing to pay
the BLM trespass fees of a rancher they bought a grazing permit from in exchange for the
ownership of the stray cattle).
182
Id. at 1253.
175
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whole or in part, the agency reallocating forage to another permittee, and the
purposes of their agreement frustrated.183
BLM regulations state that a permittee violates their grazing permit if they fail
to make “substantial grazing use” for two or more years.184 These grazing-use
requirements also mean that grazing permits need to be used at or near the maximum
level authorized in the terms and conditions of the permit or the remaining unused
portion of the permit may be transferred to another qualifying rancher who will make
use of the permit.185 In 1995, the BLM revised its grazing regulations in an attempt
to reduce this legal barrier to conservation use of grazing permits. The Clinton
Administration reform added “conservation use” as a permissible use of a grazing
permit.186 The revised regulation defined the term “grazing permit” to include “all
authorized use including livestock grazing, suspended use, and conservation use.”187
Conservation use itself was defined as “an activity, excluding livestock grazing, on
all or a portion of an allotment” for the purpose of “[p]rotecting the land and its
resources . . . [, i]mproving rangeland conditions[,] or [e]nhancing resource values
. . . .”188 Ten-year conservation use permits were to be voluntary and initiated at the
request of the permittee.189
The 1995 regulations were challenged by the livestock industry, which alleged
BLM exceeded its authority under the TGA and FLPMA by authorizing
conservation use grazing permits.190 In Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, the Tenth
Circuit agreed with the industry.191 Citing the language in the TGA that authorizes
the Secretary “to issue or cause to be issued permits to graze livestock” and similar
language in FLPMA and PRIA, the court held that a permit expressly “excluding
livestock grazing” is not a grazing permit authorized by the TGA, FLPMA, or
PRIA.192
After the decision in Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, the BLM issued
Instructional Memorandum No. 2009-057 (IM), clarifying when applications for
nonuse of a grazing permit may be supported.193 In the IM, the BLM notes that
183

Leonard & Regan, Legal and Institutional Barriers, supra note 16, at 149.
43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(a)(2).
185
Id. § 4140.1.
186
See Department Hearings and Appeals Procedures; Cooperative Relations; Grazing
Administration—Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894, 9961 (Feb. 22, 1995) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5).
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 9966 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(g)(1)).
190
Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1292 (10th Cir. 1999).
191
Id. at 1307–08.
192
Id. at 1307. The federal government appealed the Tenth Circuit’s decision to the
U.S. Supreme Court but did not seek review of this aspect of the decision. See Pub. Lands
Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 747 (2000). Thus, the Tenth Circuit’s decision on this issue
stands, at least within the jurisdiction of that court.
193
Memorandum from BLM Assistant Dir. of Renewable Res. & Planning to All State
Dir., Nonuse of Grazing Permits or Leases (Jan. 12, 2009), https://www.blm.gov/policy/im2009-057 [https://perma.cc/K232-R3PB] [hereinafter BLM Memorandum].
184
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permittees may apply to not use all or a portion of their permit or lease, but only
under two bases, including “(1) Nonuse requested by the permittee or lessee because
of personal or business reasons; and (2) Nonuse requested by the permittee or lessee
for purposes of conservation and protection of the public land.”194 The IM further
notes that while the Tenth Circuit invalidated the regulatory provisions that allowed
the BLM to issue a “conservation use” permit for a multi-year term of up to ten
years, the court did note that the BLM may approve nonuse on an annual basis if
justified based on the current year’s rangeland conditions “even when that temporary
non-use happens to last the entire duration of the permit.”195 Thus the BLM does
have authority to process a nonuse application on an annual basis when the reason
offered is for conservation and protection of the federal lands; this is called
“Conservation and Protection Nonuse” or C&P Nonuse.196 However, the IM further
notes that C&P Nonuse applications should not be used as a surrogate method to
implement a long-term grazing reduction or rest on allotments.197 Instead, the BLM
should adjust permitted grazing use or amend the land use plan to provide that the
applicable area is no longer available for grazing.198 Thus, under the BLM’s
substantial use requirement, a permittee can only reduce grazing levels temporarily
and with the BLM’s permission.
The Forest Service does not have the same storied litigation history regarding
attempted conservation use of grazing permits as the BLM, nor is it bound by the
TGA. Nevertheless, the Forest Service’s regulations require that permittees use
substantially all of the grazing opportunity provided by a grazing permit. The Forest
Service Manual specifically notes that a permittee “must graze at least 90 percent of
the number of livestock under term permit each year unless the Forest Supervisor
approves nonuse.”199 And the Handbook notes that “[p]ermits may be canceled in
whole or in part if the term permit holder fails to use range without obtaining
approval for nonuse.”200 A permittee can seek approval from the Forest Service for
nonuse of a grazing permit in whole or in part for permittee convenience, resource
protection or development, and range research.201 But if the permittee “[f]ails to
restock the allotted range after the full extent of approved personal convenience non194

Id.
Pub. Lands Council, 167 F.3d at 1308.
196
BLM Memorandum, supra note 193.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE MANUAL § 2231.7 (2005),
https://www.fs.usda.gov/cgi-bin/Directives/get_dirs/fsm?2200!.. [https://perma.cc/3BFVEHXP].
200
FSH 2209.13, supra note 166, at § 16.21.
201
Id. § 17. Nonuse approvals for personal convenience are typically granted for one
year, and only if “circumstances are unusual.” Id. § 17.1. Nonuse approval for resource
protection or development shall not exceed 5 years except when long-term development
programs requiring longer periods have been agreed upon. Id. § 17.2. Nonuse approval for
research is granted in the same manner as permits for nonuse for range protection or
development. Id. § 17.3.
195
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use has been exhausted[,]” the Forest Service’s substantial use requirement has been
violated, and the permit can be canceled.202
These substantial use requirements significantly restrict markets for voluntary
conservation of federal grazing lands by taking a key factor—the extent of grazing—
off the table. Ranchers and conservation groups can ask the relevant agency to
approve reduced grazing, but there is no guarantee that it will do so. And, even if
the agency complies, the approved reduced use or nonuse will be only temporary.
D. The Impermanence of Grazing Permit Decisions
Another obstacle to voluntary conservation arrangements on federal grazing
lands is the impermanence of grazing rights. As discussed in more detail above,
Congress has been clear that grazing permits confer no property rights or similar
interests and, thus, are entitled to none of the protections that would ordinarily
accompany such rights.203 Instead, whether to graze a particular parcel and how
much to graze are questions left to the discretion of the relevant agency.204 Thus, a
conservation group acquiring a federal grazing permit with the intent to end grazing
has no assurance that the agency will honor that wish.
Under the TGA and FLPMA, the Secretary of the Interior has the authority to
“reclassify and withdraw rangeland from grazing use” and (since the passage of
FLPMA) to “use land use plans to determine the amount of permissible grazing” and
where that grazing should occur.205 Thus, if a BLM Field Office Manager wants to
retire an allotment from grazing, they must amend the applicable land-use plan and
provide sufficient justification for the decision, such as resource damage or chronic
livestock-wildlife conflict.
Consistent with NFMA, Forest Service regulations similarly require that
“[f]orage producing National Forest System lands will be managed for livestock
grazing and the allotment plans will be prepared consistent with land management
plans.”206 Thus, decisions to retire a Forest Service allotment from grazing must also
be made via an amendment to the applicable land-use plan. The Forest Service has
also noted that “[i]f a permittee waives their grazing privileges back to the Forest
Service, there can be no guarantee or agreement, whether written or verbal,
202

36 C.F.R. § 222.4(a)(2)(iv).
43 U.S.C. § 315b. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
204
See Diamond Ring Ranch v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397, 1402 (10th Cir. 1976)
(exemplifying the BLM’s authority to modify, suspend, or revoke grazing permits for
noncompliance with the TGA or with permit terms is an inherent part of the power to issue
such permits).
205
Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 742–44 (2000). When contemplating
the importance of land use planning to grazing decisions, Professor George Coggins has
stated that FLPMA’s emphasis on the importance of land use planning suggests Congress
“intended planning to be the centerpiece of future rangeland management” and “binding on
all subsequent multiple use decisions.” George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public
Rangeland Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENV’T L. 1,
15 (1983).
206
36 C.F.R. § 222.2(c).
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regarding waived grazing capacity allocation, based upon buyout agreements
between permittees, conservation groups, or other outside parties.”207 Instead,
“[g]razing capacity allocations will be determined through the NEPA process, in
consideration of rangeland soil, wildlife, watershed, fisheries, water quality, and
other resource conditions.”208
Even when an agency amends a land-use plan to remove the area from grazing
availability, there is no guarantee that a future amendment to the land-use plan won’t
reverse that decision and once again make the area available for livestock grazing.209
Only Congress has the power to more permanently retire grazing permits or to grant
that authority to the BLM or Forest Service, an authority it has used occasionally to
facilitate voluntary grazing retirements of existing permits in national parks, national
monuments, and newly designated wilderness.210
Thus, voluntary buyouts are negotiated under substantial uncertainty and,
ultimately, may be only temporary. The February 2020 decision by the BLM to reissue grazing leases in the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in Utah,
after those leases had been bought out in the late 1990s by the Grand Canyon Trust,
illustrates the tenuousness of this approach.211 Likewise, the Bridger-Teton National
Forest has recently proposed to restock grazing leases in the Upper Green River area
in Wyoming that were previously bought out by the National Wildlife Federation.212
207

Email from Ralph Giffen, Forest Service Assistant Dir. of Rangeland Mgmt. to Terry
Padilla, Thomas Hilken, Tom McClure, Barry Imler (Apr. 3, 2014, 1:53 PM) (on file with
the authors). These policies were also included as “existing policy” in the Forest Service’s
2020 Proposed Amendment to the Grazing Management Section of its Handbook. See
Proposed FSH 2209.13, supra note 154, at § 13.7.
208
Proposed FSH 2209.13, supra note 154, at § 13.7 (citing 36 C.F.R. § 222.2(c)).
209
See, e.g., Aaron Paul, The Unwisdom of Turning Canyon Country Back into Cattle
Country, GRAND CANYON TRUST (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.grandcanyontrust.org/blog/
unwisdom-turning-canyon-country-back-cattle-country [https://perma.cc/MU6Z-T323].
210
See, e.g., Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, 123
Stat. 991 (providing for over permanent grazing retirement on 2 million acres in and near
Oregon’s Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument and in six new wilderness areas in Idaho’s
Owyhee Canyonlands); Sawtooth National Recreation Area and Jerry Peak Wilderness
Additions Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-46, 129 Stat. 476 (authorizing the USDA to accept
the donation of any valid existing leases or permits authorizing grazing on federal lands
within the Boulder White Cloud Grazing Area); Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and
Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 319, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C § 410mm-1(f)(2)) (amending the Great Basin National Park Organic
Act and allowing for the donation of grazing leases); Arches National Park Expansion Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-329, § 1, 112 Stat. 3060 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
272(a)(2)) (adding Lost Spring Canyon to Arches National Park and giving the NPS authority
to permanently retire a grazing lease in the area).
211
Leshy, supra note 96.
212
The Forest Service proposes to allow neighboring permittees to graze livestock on
the previously bought-out allotments without increasing the number of permitted livestock
on the range, a change which the livestock industry has suggested could reduce livestockgrizzly conflicts in the area but that conservation organizations counter would frustrate the
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This uncertainty likely harms both ranchers and conservation groups, as
conservation groups may reduce the amount they offer for a permit based on the risk
that their intentions for it may later be foiled.
These legal barriers to voluntary conservation, while deeply rooted in the
foundations of the U.S. grazing policy, are ripe for reconsideration in light of new
environmental demands, growing acrimony over federal land-use decisions, and
increased interest among conservationists in market approaches. Reforming federal
grazing policy to facilitate voluntary markets for conservation would require several
statutory and regulatory changes. To be successful, these reforms could take a
variety of forms, discussed below, while still retaining the basic longstanding
structure and form of the existing U.S. grazing institution.
IV. POTENTIAL POLICY PATHWAYS
Markets for voluntary conservation on federal grazing lands hold substantial
promise for reducing conflict over the federal range.213 Fully realizing this promise,
however, requires policy reforms to facilitate negotiation between ranchers and
conservation groups and the flexibility to tailor solutions to their particular needs.
Below, we consider various policy pathways that could facilitate markets for
voluntary conservation on federal grazing lands. Because the obstacles are a mix of
statutory and regulatory restrictions, we analyze both (A) administrative reforms that
could be implemented by the BLM and Forest Service without further legislation
(although Congress could, of course, enact these reforms also) and (B) legislative
reforms that would require congressional action. While the administrative reforms
are perhaps easier to implement since they do not require new legislation, they are
also more constrained because they must be consistent with existing statutes and
they are more vulnerable to reversal by future administrations.
A. Administrative Pathways
1. Rescind Substantial Grazing Use Regulations
Perhaps the most straightforward administrative option is for the BLM and
Forest Service to repeal regulations imposing substantial grazing use requirements
on federal grazing permits. Rescinding both agencies’ use requirements so that
grazing permits established only an upper limit for grazing but not a lower limit
would give ranchers and conservation groups considerably greater flexibility to

earlier buyouts and create new conflicts. See Angus M. Thuermer, Jr., Grizzly Conflicts
Central to New Upper Green River Grazing Debate, WyoFile (July 6, 2021),
https://wyofile.com/grizzly-conflicts-central-to-new-upper-green-river-grazing-debate/
[https://perma.cc/Q4D2-PAFT].
213
See Leonard et al., Allow “Nonuse Rights,” supra note 16 (making the case for
reforms that would facilitate environmental markets to address a variety of natural resource
conflicts).
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negotiate whether grazing occurs on an allotment, when, and at what levels.214 Under
this approach, a permit would only be canceled if the permittee failed to pay required
fees, harmed public resources, or otherwise violated the terms of the permit.215
This reform would empower conservation groups to create positive incentives
for ranchers who reduce grazing or adopt desired conservation practices. Generally,
ranchers and conservation groups would be free to negotiate limits on grazing to
address a wide variety of conflicts, such as riparian areas during a critical wildlife
nesting, migration corridors, livestock-grizzly conflicts, or disease transmission
risks.
While such arrangements may lack the semi-permanence of a buyout, they
would have lower upfront costs because the conservation group would not have to
acquire a base property or livestock.216 Such solutions could also be more adaptable,
allowing the conservation group to reallocate its resources as its priorities for
different areas and conservation practices change. Further, reductions in livestock
use may be less likely to provoke opposition from the ranching industry and rural
communities since the land is not permanently removed from grazing.
Where a conservation group desires greater long-term certainty, rescission of
the substantial use requirement would allow the group to acquire and hold the
grazing permit even if it chooses not to graze. Instead of risking cancelation of the
permit and reallocation of forage to someone else, the group would be eligible to
renew the permit and have “first priority” for doing so, just like any other
permittee.217 Thus, this reform could potentially sidestep controversies over
permanent retirements of grazing permits by allowing conservation groups to hold
permits without grazing.
No statute requires the BLM and Forest Service substantial use regulations. The
TGA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to issue “permits to graze livestock.”218
The ordinary meaning of “permit” in 1934 was “[w]arrant ; license ; leave ;
permission”—all of which concern only the permission to take some action, not a
requirement to do so.219 A law license, for example, authorizes a person to practice
law; it does not compel them to. This reading of the TGA is reinforced by FLPMA
214

Without substantial use requirements, several other regulations would be inoperative
and could also be repealed. For instance, because a permittee could reduce grazing without
seeking a temporary nonuse status, the rules governing the BLM’s determination whether to
grant such status, reallocation of unused forage to others, and limiting nonuse to three years
would be inoperative. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 4130.4.
215
Cf. 36 C.F.R. § 222.4(a); 43 C.F.R. § 4130.3-1.
216
Cf. supra Part III.A–B.
217
See 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(e). Notably, this right of first priority is not conditioned on
the full utilization of forage but on the land remaining “available for domestic livestock
grazing.” Id.
218
43 U.S.C. § 315b.
219
Permit, in WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1607
(W.T. Harris & F. Sturges Allen eds. 1910); see also Permit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
893–94 (2d ed. 1910) (“A written license or warrant, issued by a person in authority,
empowering the grantee to do some act not forbidden by law, but not allowable without such
authority.”).
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and PRIA, which define “grazing permit and lease” as “any document authorizing
use of public lands . . . for the purpose of grazing domestic livestock.”220 Likewise,
the Forest Service’s authority to issue grazing permits, which is even less restricted
than BLM’s, contains no requirement that permits compel substantial use.221
For this reason, rescinding substantial grazing use requirements avoids the
problem raised in Public Lands Council v. Babbitt.222 As discussed in more detail
above, in that case, the Tenth Circuit declared unlawful the BLM’s “conservation
use” regulation, which provided for a grazing permit that expressly excludes
livestock grazing for the entire term of the permit.223 This exceeded the agency’s
authority, the court reasoned, because such conservation use permits do not
authorize any grazing and, therefore, are not “permits to graze livestock” authorized
by the TGA.224 A grazing permit that authorized grazing but did not require it would
be fully consistent with these authorities. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit observed that
“permittees may voluntarily reduce their grazing levels[,]” distinguishing these
voluntary decisions from a permit that expressly precluded grazing.225 The key
difference in making such voluntary reductions permissible is that it is the permittee,
not the agency, who determines whether the full grazing allocation is used.226 The
agency’s role in such a situation is limited to authorizing grazing under the permit,
precisely what Public Lands Council interprets the TGA to require.
Rescinding these requirements would also not frustrate any other aspect of the
relevant statutes and regulations. In 2006, the BLM suggested the contrary, implying
that the substantial use requirement is necessary because FLPMA “designates
livestock grazing as a ‘principal or major use’ of public lands.”227 But this view is
mistaken. True, FLPMA defines “principal or major use” as “limited to[] domestic
livestock grazing, fish and wildlife development and utilization, mineral exploration
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Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1308 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing 43
U.S.C. §§ 1702(p), 1902(c)) (emphasis added).
221
The genesis of the Forest Service’s grazing program is the agency’s general
authorization to issue rules and regulations governing use of national forests. See Forest
Service Organic Administration Act of 1897, Pub. L. No. 55-2, 30 Stat. 11, 34 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 473–482, 551). Congress has subsequently limited Forest Service
grazing permits to ten-year terms. See Granger-Thye Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-478, 64
Stat. 82 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C § 5801).
222
167 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999).
223
Id. at 1307.
224
Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 315b).
225
Id. at 1308.
226
Our analysis in this section appears to differ from the BLM’s reading of Public
Lands Council. In a 2009 Instruction Memorandum, the BLM informed state directors that
the conservation use regulations were no longer operative after Public Lands Council. Where
the agency desired to reduce use for conservation purposes, according to the memo, it could
do so only one year at a time. See BLM Memorandum, supra note 193.
227
Grazing Administration–Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg. 39402, 39485 (July 12,
2006) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 4100) (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1702(l)), invalidated by
W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472 (9th Cir. 2011).
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and production, rights-of-way, outdoor recreation, and timber production.”228
However, it uses this defined phrase in only one subsection, authorizing the
exclusion, or “total elimination,” of a principal or major use provided that (1) the
Secretary’s decision does not purport to be permanent and (2) the decision is
reported to Congress if it affects 100,000 acres or more.229 Thus, this phrase is
relevant only to the government’s own decisions to close an area to grazing or any
other principal or major use. It is irrelevant to private, voluntary decisions about how
much forage to use.
The BLM has also suggested that a prior determination that land is “chiefly
valuable for grazing,” which makes the land eligible for inclusion in a grazing
district, dictates that it must be grazed to the full extent authorized.230 However, the
BLM has subsequently—and correctly—rejected this interpretation.231 The TGA
allows only lands deemed chiefly valuable for grazing to be included in grazing
districts.232 However, this is expressly a discretionary decision; there is no
requirement that such lands be added to a grazing district or be retained within it.233
Nor does the statute’s text lend any support to the notion that, once land is deemed
chiefly valuable for grazing, the agency must compel its use to the maximum extent
permissible.
Of course, there may be situations where it is desirable to maintain a certain
amount of grazing to achieve rangeland health, wildfire management, or other
goals.234 But this does not justify the substantial use requirements. Instead, it
suggests that the relevant agency should impose minimum grazing requirements on
individual permits based on the particular condition and goals of that allotment.235
228

43 U.S.C. § 1702(l).
43 U.S.C. § 1712(e)(1).
230
See Pub. Lands Council, 167 F.3d at 1308.
231
Memorandum from William G. Myers III, U.S. Dep’t Interior Solicitor on
Clarification of M-37008 to Assistant Secretary of Pol’y, Mgmt. & Budget, Assistant
Secretary of Land & Mins. Mgmt., & Dir. of Bureau of Land Mgmt. (May 13, 2003).
232
43 U.S.C. § 315.
233
Cf. John C. Yoo, The Executive Power of Reversal, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59,
66–67 (2019) (noting that the discretionary power to take executive action includes the power
to reverse that decision according to the same terms and process).
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See, e.g., Devii Rao, Benefits of Cattle Grazing for Reducing Fire Fuels and Hazard,
U.C. BERKELEY RAUSSER COLLEGE OF NAT. RES. (Sept. 11, 2020), https://nature.berkeley.
edu/news/2020/09/benefits-cattle-grazing-reducing-fire-fuels-and-fire-hazard [https://perm
a.cc/DKV5-D69D].
235
Repealing these regulations should not disqualify a permit for reissuance under the
existing grazing categorical exclusion from National Environmental Policy Act review. See
U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, EXISTING CATEGORICAL EXCLUSIONS 22 (2020),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/doi-and-bureau-categorical-exclusions-dec2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3N7B-LPSG]. That exclusion provides that issuance of a grazing permit is
categorically excluded from NEPA if (1) the new permit is consistent with the use specified
in the prior permit and (2) the land is meeting land health standards (or failing them for
reasons unrelated to the permittee’s actions). Id. at 21. Regarding the first criteria, the
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Tailoring any minimum grazing requirements in this way would have at least two
salutary benefits compared to the status quo. First, minimum grazing requirements
are substantially less likely to be arbitrary because imposing minimums on
individual permits would require justification based on specific conditions and
scientific evidence, whereas the across-the-board approach bears no relationship to
such information. Second, precise minimum grazing requirements would send a
useful signal to permittees and conservation organizations about areas with more or
less opportunity to advance conservation goals through negotiation.
Because repealing substantial grazing use requirements would transfer some
decision-making from the federal agency to permittees, it arguably reduces the
agency’s control over the land, a concern the Forest Service has raised in the context
of third-party buyouts.236 However, this objection would be weakened if the
substantial use requirement were to be rescinded because the agency would retain
authority to set the maximum and, if appropriate, minimum grazing requirements to
manage rangeland health. Moreover, a grazing permit without a substantial use
requirement would operate like many other uses of federal land. For example, when
the Forest Service authorizes use of a trail, individual recreators decide whether and
how much to use that trail. And when the BLM issues an oil and gas lease, the
operator decides when and if to drill. In this and other contexts, the federal-land
user’s discretion does not raise any concern that the agency has given up its control
of federal land.237
The rescission of the substantial use requirement would also benefit grazing
permittees by giving them more control over their businesses.238 Currently,
permittees can request to reduce or suspend grazing based on financial difficulties,
Department of the Interior has explained that a new permit is consistent with the prior permit
so long as “the active use previously authorized is not exceeded.” Id. The Forest Service has
an identical exclusion for approving its grazing permits. See 43 U.S.C. § 1752(h).
236
See DIRECTIVES UPDATES, supra note 141 (proposing to incorporate this position in
formal management directives).
237
Indeed, the outcome-based grazing initiative discussed below similarly gives
permittees flexibility to determine how to graze federal allotments, without any suggestion
from the BLM that it sees that flexibility as depriving it of ultimate responsibility for
managing federal land. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Interior, BLM Offers Livestock
Operators Increased Flexibility Through Outcome-based Grazing Authorizations (Sept. 22,
2017),
https://www.blm.gov/press-release/blm-offers-livestock-operators-increasedflexibility%C2%A0through-outcome-based-grazing
[https://perma.cc/HXV9-UEDB]
[hereinafter BLM Offers Flexibility].
238
See, e.g., Letter from Ariz. Ass’n of Conservation Dists., Cal. Rangeland
Conservation Coal., Malpai Borderlands Grp., Nat’l Ass’n of Conservation Dists., N. Am.
Grouse Partnership, Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Pheasants Forever, Pub. Lands Foundation, Quail
Forever & Rocky Mountain Farmers Union et al. on Revisions to BLM Grazing Regulations
to Bureau of Land Mgmt., at 2 (June 18, 2020), https://westernlandowners.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/Collaborative-Letter-on-Revisions-to-BLM-Grazing-Regulations
.vF_.061820.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JW5-L23S] (noting, generally, the benefits of providing
clear regulatory permission for permittees to “consider how temporary nonuse may benefit
their operations”).
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temporary reductions in herd size, and other business reasons.239 However, they are
not entitled to make such decisions without approval from the BLM and Forest
Service.240 Moreover, permittees can lose their permit or part of their permit and
their grazing privileges if their business circumstances require reduced use for more
than a few seasons.241 Without the substantial use requirement, grazing permittees
would have more flexibility to adapt their use to changing circumstances.
2. Maximize Flexibility Under Outcome-Based Grazing Authorizations
Another administrative pathway is the Outcome-Based Grazing initiative that
BLM announced in 2017.242 Traditional grazing permits micromanage permittees’
use of federal lands, dictating the number of animals to be grazed, type of livestock,
dates of access, and where on the allotment grazing should occur. This focus on
process and prescription can be suboptimal if, for instance, conditions on the
allotment vary from those anticipated when the rules were set.243 The OutcomeBased Grazing initiative seeks to shift the BLM’s focus to ecological outcomes
while giving permittees more flexibility to achieve them.244 In this way, the initiative
seeks to respond more quickly and effectively to changing conditions and to reward
permittees for achieving predetermined goals.245
In 2018, the BLM selected eleven demonstration projects in six states to
experiment with this new model.246 The Deep Creek Ranch in Burley, Idaho, was
chosen as one of the demonstration projects.247 Previously, the ranch’s permit had
strict dates for when cattle had to be moved on and off different pastures.248 But
these rotations rarely matched conditions on the grounds, causing the permittee to
move its livestock from pastures that still had excess forage to pastures that had not
yet entered the growing season.249 Instead of these fixed on/off dates, the permittee’s
239

36 C.F.R. § 222.4(8); 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(g).
See sources cited supra note 239.
241
See 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(g).
242
See BLM Offers Flexibility, supra note 237.
243
See Gregg Simonds, Sailing the Sagebrush Sea, 34 PROP. & ENV’T RSCH. CTR. REPS.
30, 32 (2015), https://www.perc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WEB-FINAL_PERCRep
orts_Winter2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/G654-SMYG] (noting that “policies that restrict the
duration or season of grazing . . . can undermine the very management practices that are
needed most” and that “[s]trict limits on the frequency or intensity of grazing can also hinder
what we now understand to be proper rangeland management.”).
244
See BLM Offers Flexibility, supra note 237.
245
See id.
246
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Interior, BLM Announces Outcome-Based Grazing
Projects for 2018 (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.blm.gov/press-release/blm-announcesoutcome-based-grazing-projects-2018 [https://perma.cc/R7X9-2LDY].
247
See id.
248
Id.
249
See Outcome-Based Grazing Program, PARTNERS IN THE SAGE, https://www.partner
sinthesage.com/s/OGBA-profile-Deep-Creek-Ranch-myl3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JESMLGP] (last visited Aug. 7, 2022).
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new outcome-based grazing permit gave the ranch flexibility to adjust rotations to
hit range-condition targets.250
The Outcome-Based Grazing initiative could facilitate markets for nonuse of
federal grazing permits by expanding the flexibility afforded to permittees to include
deciding how many livestock to graze. This would require further regulatory
changes, such as excluding outcome-based grazing permits from the substantial use
requirements.251 This way, the agencies could experiment with these reforms in a
subset of closely watched permits and, thereby, evaluate the potential effects of
wholesale reform.
Conservation organizations could also benefit from the increased flexibility by
influencing how permittees achieve or exceed rangeland health goals. A
conservation group could, for instance, provide an incentive for permittees to adjust
the timing, location, or number of animals grazed to accommodate wildlife
migration or improve a watershed.
Such a model also offers a way to address potential concerns over the effect of
nonuse on rangeland health and overall federal land management. By defining
certain ecological outcomes that must be met regardless of whether the permit is
used for livestock grazing or not, federal managers can ensure overall rangeland
health is maintained. In this way, permittees can have greater flexibility over the
amount and timing of grazing as long as prescribed land management outcomes are
achieved.
While the lessons learned from the initial eleven demonstration projects are
being incorporated into the BLM’s ongoing regulatory revision process, outcomebased grazing remains an experiment.252 Success depends on the ability of BLM
managers to develop, monitor, and enforce outcome objectives. It will also require
navigating other environmental laws and litigation.253 However, the current
250

See Bureau of Land Mgmt. in Idaho, Outcome Based Grazing, YOUTUBE (Apr. 22,
2019), https://youtu.be/wo35rmT9nCc [https://perma.cc/Z5FH-NH99].
251
The Forest Service’s Forest Stewardship Contracting program could be an
informative model to draw from. The stewardship contracting program addresses restoration
on Forest System lands by allowing contracts (often signed with community partners) that
exchange the removal of forest products for restoration services. See FOREST SERV., U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., STEWARDSHIP CONTRACTING: BASIC STEWARDSHIP CONTRACTING
CONCEPTS (Aug. 2009), https://www.fs.fed.us/restoration/documents/stewardship/steward
ship_brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PTR-2AZ9].
252
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Interior, BLM Takes Steps to Improve Administration
of Grazing Regulations on Public Lands (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.blm.gov/pressrelease/blm-takes-steps-improve-administration-grazing-regulations-public-lands [https://
perma.cc/5H22-4RDB].
253
See, e.g., Lawsuit Filed Against BLM over New Grazing Program, NORTHERN AG
NETWORK (Oct. 1, 2019), https://northernag.net/lawsuit-filed-against-blm-over-newgrazing-program/ [https://perma.cc/EMG9-59YA]. On March 19, 2021, Judge Sweitzer, an
administrative law judge with the Interior Board of Land Appeals, found that the BLM failed
to adequately examine in a NEPA document the potential harm of utilizing the Outcome
Based Grazing program to expand grazing into sage grouse habitat in Nevada. Wildlands
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administration has expressed its support for the program, suggesting that it will get
a fair chance to succeed.254
3. Use Exchange Authorities to Facilitate Voluntary Conservation Transactions
Another option to facilitate markets for voluntary conservation would be for
the BLM and Forest Service to use their authority to exchange federal land for
private land. FLPMA authorizes both agencies to exchange lands if they are of equal
value and the exchange would be in the public interest.255 The agencies frequently
exercise this authority to consolidate scattered landholdings and, thereby, improve
the management and use of the resulting larger block of federal land.256 They also
use the authority to dispose of relatively low-value (to the agencies) land—often
lacking legal public access—for land elsewhere that is more environmentally
sensitive, useful for public recreation, or suitable for some other public purpose.257
From 2006 to 2015, the BLM exchanged 159,130 acres of federal land for 193,663
acres of private land.258
Exchanges could facilitate voluntary conservation by allowing a conservation
group to acquire the federal land they wish to remove from grazing in exchange for
private grazing lands elsewhere that are potentially more valuable. This may seem a
non-intuitive approach since it involves public-land supporters removing
ecologically sensitive lands from the public domain. Moreover, the public may be
concerned about these transfers, especially if they become common and the
Def., NV-010-21-01 (IBLA Mar. 19, 2021). This decision is likely to be appealed to a federal
district court. It is also not yet clear if the current administration will continue to authorize
grazing permits under the Outcome-Based Grazing program. See Steve Davies, Nevada
Grazing Permit Decision Has Ranchers Concerned, AGRIPULSE (Apr. 7, 2021, 5:33 AM),
https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/15642-nevada-grazing-permit-decision-has-ranchersconcerned [https://perma.cc/C8FP-WSD8].
254
See David McCumber, Montana’s Tracy Stone-Manning: BLM Director Has Lots
of Acres and a Big To-Do List, MONT. STANDARD (Jan. 3, 2022), https://mtstandard.com/
news/state-and-regional/montanas-tracy-stone-manning-blm-director-has-lots-of-acres-anda-big-to-do/article_310fbffb-dd41-5655-add9-1a4972af3c7f.html [https://perma.cc/HVH4ATKY] (reporting a comment from an incoming BLM Director that, “[t]he thought behind
[outcome-based grazing] is exactly where we need to go: Determine the outcome we’re
looking for on the landscape and graze accordingly”).
255
See 43 U.S.C. § 1715(a).
256
For a discussion of the process of consolidating fragmented public lands, and the
benefits of doing so, see L. Claire Powers, Ashley E. Larsen, Bryan Leonard & Andrew J.
Plantinga, Reconnecting Stranded Public Lands Is a Win-Win for Conservation and People,
270 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 109557, at 2 (2022).
257
Melanie Tang, SNPLMA, FLTFA, and the Future of Public Land Exchanges, 9
HASTINGS ENV’T L. J. 55, 59–76 (2002).
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CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41509, LAND EXCHANGES: BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
(BLM) PROCESS AND ISSUES 2–3 (2016), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20161107_
R41509_11228ea8dd01d3e69dc731e81c7c726e38dd2cba.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3UXYGBAK].
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transferred lands are viewed as valuable for hunting, recreation, or other public uses.
But the practice is already well-established at the state level, where there are fewer
restrictions on conservation groups’ ability to negotiate exchanges for state lands.259
Concerns about transferring lands out of public ownership could be addressed in at
least two ways. First, the conservation group could agree to a conservation easement
to protect the land and retain certain public uses.260 Second, the conservation group
could donate the land back to the federal government with conditions restricting the
future use of that land.261
Although this would be a reversal of the more common pattern—usually, the
BLM or Forest Service ends up holding higher conservation value land after an
exchange—that need not be an obstacle because nothing in FLPMA compels this
result.262 Indeed, exchanging sensitive land for land with high potential for economic
use may be easier in some sense than the reverse. Federal appraisal requirements
dictate that land must be assessed according to the market value of the “highest and
best use,”263 a standard that disadvantages lands with high conservation value but
limited economic use. This standard can make difficult exchanges where the BLM
or Forest Service seek to acquire lands for conservation purposes.264 But when
trading such lands to a conservation organization in exchange for more economically
productive land, the standard’s bias cuts in favor of the exchange.
This solution is not without its challenges, of course. Land exchanges are a
time-consuming and costly process due to the extensive environmental, valuation,
and other reviews they must undergo.265 Without a substantial commitment from the
BLM and Forest Service, both nationally and in local offices, the process may be
259

See SUSAN CULP & JOE MARLOW, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, CONSERVING
STATE TRUST LANDS: STRATEGIES FOR THE INTERMOUNTAIN WEST 3, 18–20 (2015),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/conserving-state-trust-lands-full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z953-33PW].
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See, e.g., Helena Dore, Land Swap in the South Crazy Mountains Completed,
BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (Jan. 19, 2022), https://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/
environment/land-swap-in-the-south-crazy-mountains-completed/article_2b40349c-209658dd-b06d-07d304e4aec0.html [https://perma.cc/X5EE-CJHV] (describing a recent land
exchange that included conservation easements and public access).
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See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MS-1105–DONATIONS,
SOLICITATION, AND FUNDRAISING 1-15 (2019), https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/MS
-1105%20rel.%201-1801.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK6Y-VCUZ] (observing that acceptance of
restricted donations is appropriate, provided the restrictions would not conflict with the
mission, programs, and laws governing the agency).
262
43 U.S.C. § 1716 (setting out standards for exchanges).
263
43 C.F.R. § 2201.3-2(a); 36 C.F.R. § 245.9(b).
264
See Proposed BLM Purchase of Lower Musselshell River Ranch Rejected, MONT.
LAND SOURCE (Aug. 3, 2021), https://mtlandsource.com/news/proposed-blm-purchaselower-musshell-river-ranch-rejected [https://perma.cc/SH2R-7PM6] (explaining that BLM’s
attempted purchase of 11,000-acre private ranch fell through because agency appraisals
“cannot account for conservation values . . . .”).
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See Dore, supra note 260 (noting that the South Crazy Mountain Land Exchange
took more than a decade to complete).
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too slow or expensive to attract proposed exchanges. It would also require
substantial commitment from the conservation proponent. In addition to acquiring
the base property to obtain the grazing permit, the proponent would also need to
acquire similarly valuable private lands within the state to offer the agency in
exchange. And such investments would not be without substantial risk. While
federal policy encourages early, informal discussions regarding potential
exchanges,266 the BLM and Forest Service cannot commit to approving them until
all procedural and substantive requirements have been met. However, once
finalized, this method would give the conservation purchaser control over the
conserved land and, therefore, a sense of permanence that is impossible if the land
remains controlled by a political body.267
This approach could address several of the objections to nonuse of grazing
permits. First, it would not necessarily reduce the total amount of federal land
available for grazing. If the private land exchanged for federal land were suitable for
grazing, grazing would simply shift among parcels rather than being generally
reduced. Moreover, if the exchanged land were more suitable for grazing and less
environmentally sensitive, it's possible that federal-land grazing could actually
increase.268 This could reduce the perception that nonuse rights necessarily come at
the expense of grazing interests.
Second, it could avoid the impression that conservation interests or ranching
interests are getting an unfair advantage over the other. Instead of giving one an
avenue to achieve their goals permanently while the other is relegated to short-term
commitments, the exchange authority would apply equally to both conservation
groups and ranchers.269 For instance, the BLM-Wyoming office has considered a
proposal, facilitated by a conservation organization, to exchange various isolated
public grazing lands in exchange for a more than 6,000-acre private ranch with

266

See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, H-2200-1 LAND
EXCHANGE HANDBOOK 1-15 (2007), https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/H-2200-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WU2-VTWD].
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We refer to some outcomes, such as the retirement of grazing permits, as
“permanent” to distinguish it from explicitly temporary means of securing nonuse. But as
long as the relevant land remains public, it is possible that Congress may change the rules
governing it without creating any recourse for the organization responsible for the retirement.
If a conservation group acquired the land by exchange, however, it would enjoy the same
protections against expropriation as any other private land.
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Exchanges need not be acre for acre. Instead, the federal government must receive
equal value for the land it conveys. See, e.g., Southeast Wyoming Land Exchange, BUREAU
OF LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/southeast-wyoming-land-exchange [https://perma.
cc/4QXM-WJT4] (last visited Aug. 9, 2022).
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One significant obstacle to such exchanges is that the federal appraisal process does
not capture conservation value well. See Smith Monson, Note, Treating the Blue Rash: WinWin Solutions and Improving the Land Exchange Process, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 241, 268–69
(2015). This makes it unnecessarily difficult for federal agencies to accept lands with unique
conservation values or to trade lands with higher economic potential.
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higher recreation and conservation value.270 If the exchange is ultimately approved,
the former BLM lands could be sold as private property to the current grazing
permittees.271 Of course, the BLM and Forest Service’s exchange authority is
discretionary, meaning that conservation or ranching interests may receive better
receptions in some administrations than others. But, in principle, this approach is
equally open to either interest.
These administrative reforms could be implemented by the BLM and Forest
Service without congressional action, making them easier to implement. However,
they are also more limited, modest, and vulnerable to reversal than the legislative
pathways discussed below.
B. Legislative Pathways
While administrative pathways are substantially constrained by existing law,
Congress faces no such limits.272 Therefore, legislative pathways are almost
infinitely variable. Here we will focus on a few broad ideas.
1. Authorize Conservation Use
Although the Tenth Circuit has held that a “conservation use” permit exceeds
the BLM’s authority under the TGA,273 Congress is free to overrule that decision.
Under this approach, Congress could authorize conservation use as a permissible use
of a grazing permit. In doing so, Congress could also choose to fill in the details of
a conservation use program. For example, it could require agency approval of a
switch from grazing to conservation use or leave the decision to permittees. The
former option, which is what the BLM adopted in 1994 in its ultimately struck-down
regulations, preserves agency discretion but may increase the transaction costs of
voluntary conservation.
An advantage of recognizing conservation-use leasing is that it would largely
preserve the existing structure and allocation of federal grazing permits, thereby
avoiding the uncertainty and complexity of a more comprehensive change. The other
requirements of federal grazing policy (e.g., the livestock-ownership and baseproperty requirements) would remain in place, but “conservation use” would be an
acceptable method to maintain existing grazing permits.
As discussed more fully above, there is some precedent for such a focused
legislative fix in natural resource law: western states’ water law reforms recognized
that instream-flow conservation as a form of “beneficial use” is sufficient to
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See Angus M. Thuermer, Jr., Land Swap Would Create 38,000-Acre Public Block
in SE Wyo, WYOFILE (Oct. 19, 2021), https://wyofile.com/land-swap-would-create-38000acre-public-block-in-se-wyo/ [https://perma.cc/4979-3PWP].
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See id.
272
Under the Constitution’s Property Clause, Congress’ authority over federal lands is
plenary. See Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581 (1987).
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Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1307 (10th Cir. 1999).
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maintain a valid water right under the prior appropriation doctrine.274 If applied to
federal grazing policy, this approach would also maintain the option of future
livestock grazing on permitted allotments, which may be an important factor in
gaining broader acceptance for such a policy change. Just as instream-flow water
rights are typically not permanent acquisitions or retirements of water rights, the
authorized use of a grazing permit—whether for sheep, cattle, bison, or, in this case,
“conservation use”—is likewise not permanent and can be modified in the future
under applicable law.275 While this may seem suboptimal from the perspective of
some conservation organizations that prefer permanent retirement of grazing
privileges,276 that preference may not discourage transactions. Such groups
frequently engage in similar temporary rights-based transactions to conserve water
and other natural resources.277 Moreover, since this approach maintains the existing
structure of grazing permits and does not permanently remove allotments from
future grazing, it may avoid some of the opposition that previous permit-retirement
proposals have received from ranchers and rural communities.
From a conservation perspective, there may be important advantages of such a
rights-based approach. In particular, this approach could enable better adaptations
to evolving market conditions and environmental realities.278 For example, climate
change is likely to reshape conservation priorities by altering the condition of federal
grazing allotments or altering the market conditions related to livestock grazing in
parts of the arid West.279 As a result, rather than seeking permanent retirements,
environmental priorities may be better served by allowing groups to negotiate freely
with existing permittees to modify the use of their permits in ways that could
facilitate conservation use on a timely, adaptive, and evolving basis. By enabling
contracting with existing permittees, such a strategy would also allow environmental
groups to conserve rangelands at less than the full cost of outright acquisition or
274

See supra Part III.
See SCARBOROUGH, supra note 117, at 22.
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retirement of grazing permits. Allowing conservation use of grazing permits could
also facilitate various leasing or subleasing options or other innovative arrangements
between ranchers and environmental organizations.280
Under this legislative approach, conservation groups would have several
market-based options to pursue voluntary grazing reductions on federal lands: (1)
they could negotiate with existing permittees to facilitate “conservation use” of
existing grazing permits, either in part or in full, subject to the approval of the BLM
or Forest Service; or (2) they could negotiate to acquire the permits directly and hold
them for conservation purposes with the approval of the relevant agency, so long as
they also satisfy the livestock-ownership and base-property requirements. This latter
approach is similar to what the Grand Canyon Trust pursued with its buyouts in
Utah, which included acquiring base properties and obtaining a minimum number
of livestock.281 However, because the group could not legally hold a federal grazing
permit for “conservation use,” its attempt to pursue a market-based strategy to
reduce grazing on federal lands has encountered significant challenges.282 This
proposed solution would resolve those challenges.
2. Remove Requirements to Own Livestock and Base Property
Congress could further facilitate voluntary conservation by removing livestockownership and base-property requirements. This would enable conservation groups
to more easily acquire federal grazing permits for conservation purposes without
having to own nearby private property or livestock.283 Coupled with other reforms
discussed above, such a change would significantly reduce the transaction costs
associated with a grazing lease buyout.284
For this to occur on lands managed by the BLM, Congress would have to amend
the TGA, which limits permits to “bona fide settlers, residents, and other stock
owners.”285 For the Forest Service, however, such a change could be made through
administrative reforms. The TGA does not apply to the Forest Service, and although
the agency has adopted regulations that are similar to what the TGA requires,286 it
could revise those regulations to remove livestock-ownership and base-property
requirements.
280
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There are good reasons for Congress and the Forest Service to make such a
change to remove the base property and livestock ownership requirements. The
original speculation concern that “the herds of nonresidents,” namely Texas cattle
barons, would destroy the local pasture287 faded once the open range was closed,
and, along with it, the rationale for requiring ownership of local base-property.
Further, because the livestock-ownership requirement has been interpreted to require
ownership of just a few stray cattle,288 the livestock-ownership provisions are ripe
for rescission as well.
3. Grant Agencies Administrative Retirement Authority
Another legislative option would be for Congress to grant the BLM and Forest
Service general authority to administratively retire grazing allotments at the request
of the permit holder. This buyout and retirement solution was previously proposed
by John Leshy and Molly McUsic in a 2008 article suggesting that it would “bring
more private philanthropic capital to bear, because conservation buyers would have
assurance they would get what they are paying for . . . .”289
While conservation groups may prefer a legislative solution that allows
agencies to permanently retire a grazing allotment after a voluntary retirement,
ranchers are likely to strongly oppose any such limitation. To the ranching
community, a permanent retirement may be perceived as unfair since ranchers enjoy
no such permanency when it comes to grazing federal allotments. This objection
might be resolved in several ways. Congress could make federal grazing privileges
operate more like secure property rights. Alternatively, Congress could provide that
a retirement can be reversed, but only with the consent of the conservation group
that originally obtained the retirement. This way, retired lands could be put back into
grazing use if market conditions, the land’s conservation value, or a conservation
group’s priorities change.290
If pairing a retirement authority with more formal property rights for ranchers
were not politically feasible, rancher concerns might also be addressed by limiting
the number of retirements that can be made by year, by agency, or by state. A version
of this type of limited permanent retirement authority policy was included in Rep.
Adam Smith’s proposed 2020 legislation, H.R. 5737, which would have limited the
number of retirements the BLM and Forest Service were permitted to make to an
aggregate total of 100 permits per year, with no more than 25 permits coming from
any individual state.291 Limiting the number of retirements in this way would likely
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encourage conservationists to prioritize allotment retirements in high-value
conservation areas.
While limitations placed on the agency’s administrative retirement authority,
like those contained in H.R. 5737, may help reduce concerns that this type of policy
will result in any widespread reduction of livestock grazing on public lands, many
in the grazing industry continued to oppose this bill citing opposition to any policy
that results in a net reduction in grazing AUMs on federal land.292 To address this
concern, lawmakers could consider including language in the proposal that requires
federal agencies to assist in finding alternative grazing allotments (on the same unit
of federal land or on other nearby units) to replace those lost by the permanent
retirement. This alternative would allow federal agencies to maintain the total
number of federal grazing AUMs, while also providing the agencies with a tool to
eliminate livestock grazing in conflict areas.
On the other side, there are likely those who would feel that setting a cap on the
number of agency retirements is an unnecessary market restriction, dampening the
effect of a much-needed tool to address ecological degradation and conflict caused
by federal livestock grazing. Sticking to this point, however, may preclude the
passage of any policy granting the agencies permanent retirement authority,
perpetuating the current “uneasy stalemate.”293
4. Recognize Grazing Privileges as Formal Property Rights
In the private land context, conservationists are free to negotiate with
landowners to advance their conservation goals.294 Indeed, the National
Conservation Easement Database, a project sponsored by Ducks Unlimited and the
Trust for Public Land, reports that approximately 200,000 conservation easements
exist in the United States, conserving nearly 33 million acres of private land.295
Private land can also be conserved by conservation interests purchasing the land
from willing sellers, as groups like The Nature Conservancy do routinely.296 Because
private rights to land are generally secure, divisible, and tradeable in the property
rights system, private landowners can more easily adapt to competing demands for
land or resources.
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The obstacles blocking markets in the nonuse of grazing lands are uniquely a
public-land problem. For that reason, an obvious solution could be to make them
private, either by disposing of the land itself or by converting grazing privileges into
secure property rights. While perhaps a radical departure from the status quo, such
change would facilitate the resolution of grazing conflicts through negotiation, as
such conflicts are often resolved in the private land context. Although proposals like
this have been around for decades,297 they raise considerable political controversy.
5. Expand Targeted or Regional Approaches to Resolve Specific Conflicts
An alternative to these broad legislative reforms is to apply them at a regional
or site-specific level. Congress could, for instance, allow agencies to retire grazing
permits voluntarily surrendered by ranchers or conservation groups in areas with a
specific grazing conflict. For example, Congress could enact legislation targeted at
reducing carnivore-livestock conflict in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem and
could provide the agencies within the area with authority to permanently retire
grazing leases. To address concerns from the ranching community, Congress could
also limit the total number of retirements allowed. This same approach could be
applied within the sagebrush ecosystem to address sage grouse conservation or in
targeted delicate desert environments to protect riparian areas. This type of targeted
or regional approach could help reduce concerns over widespread grazing permit
retirements by focusing on specific issues and specific areas.
Congress has utilized this approach in the past to allow buyout and permanent
retirement of oil and gas leases in sensitive locations. The Wyoming Range Legacy
Act is an example of a Congressional act that provided authority to the Forest
Service to accept for permanent retirement oil and gas leases on more than 80,000
acres voluntarily purchased by environmental groups within the Bridger-Teton
National Forest in Wyoming.298 The Act was passed at the bequest of local
sportsmen and conservationists who successfully argued the area’s preservation
value outweighed its oil and gas potential.299 Conservationists raised $8.75 million
to buy out some of the most controversial leases in the area.300
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Another example is President Biden’s recent proclamation on the boundaries
of Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument.301 It directs the Secretary of the
Interior to “retire from livestock grazing” lands within the monument when the
permittee voluntarily relinquishes grazing rights.302 The proclamation also states that
forage covered by such retirement “shall not be reallocated for livestock grazing
purposes” except to advance the purposes of the monument.303 This was the first
time a President purported to establish a retirement authority in a monument
proclamation, so it remains to be seen whether it will be challenged and upheld.304
However, it is a noteworthy example of a narrow retirement authority being put
forward as the solution to a localized conflict between grazing and conservation
values.
CONCLUSION
Conflicts over the use of federal rangelands are not new; however, efforts to
resolve those conflicting demands through voluntary market exchanges rather than
political actions or litigation are becoming increasingly common, despite legal
obstacles to conservation leasing. Recent attempts by environmental groups to
negotiate with ranchers to pursue conservation outcomes have been met with mixed
results due to legal and institutional barriers that preclude markets for voluntary
conservation on federal grazing lands. A form of “use it or lose it,” these
requirements effectively prohibit conservation leasing and other flexible tools on
federal rangelands, leaving environmental groups with few options other than to
lobby or litigate to reduce grazing on federal lands.
It doesn’t have to be this way. There are several statutory and regulatory
reforms that Congress and federal agencies could pursue to overcome these barriers
and facilitate markets for conservation on federal grazing lands, some more easy to
implement than others. If adopted, these reforms would have several advantages
over the status quo: (1) they would promote voluntary, mutually beneficial
exchanges between ranchers and environmentalists—two groups that are often in
conflict with one another; (2) they would reduce these conflicts by providing
environmental groups with a pragmatic alternative to litigation that honors ranchers’
long-standing grazing privileges and encourages honest bargains that reflect the
value of foregone land uses; and (3) they would also result in more durable
conservation outcomes that cannot be easily reversed as political realities change.
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Such reforms are important in light of new environmental realities and evolving
demands over the use of federal rangelands. Climate change is likely to alter the
condition of federal rangelands, and, as a result, conservation priorities will need to
continually evolve and adapt. Nonuse leasing would enable conservation on federal
rangelands to be pursued on an adaptive, evolving basis that can respond to
environmental changes. Growing conflicts between livestock and wildlife, such as
grizzly bears and wolves, whose populations have increased in recent decades, also
demonstrate the need for such solutions. Allowing conservation leasing of federal
grazing permits could also advance the Biden Administration’s goal to conserve
30% of U.S. lands and waters by 2030.305 To the extent that achieving that goal
implicates areas of public land with existing resource rights and privileges—such as
the 220 million acres of federal lands that are used for livestock grazing today306—
new tools and approaches are likely to be needed, including opening markets for
voluntary conservation on federal grazing lands.
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